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FOREWORD

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

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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NEWPORT, R. I.

UNITED STATES GLOBAL STRATEGY

An address delivered
at the Naval War College
Global Strategy Discussions
on 10 June 1965

by

The Honorable Paul H. Nitze
Secretary of the Navy

The key word in the title of these seminars is worth a moment's thought. It is the term *strategic*. Only in the last twenty years or so has that word, along with the related word *strategy*, come to figure importantly in American policies toward the external world. The root term is *strategos*. It is the Greek word for a general--a high military authority.

A strategic view of the world entails looking at it with a concern for considerations of military security. A major power, constrained to preserve its influence in the world--a world marked by divided interests--necessarily has to take a strategic view. Some positions have inherent importance in relation to access to other positions. The great crossroads of the world, the sea narrows, the key peninsulas, the continental gateways, count strategically. A great power inherently projects concern in how control of such areas is disposed. A strategic view must take account of who are friends and who are putative enemies and what are their likely potentials. It takes into account the combination of interests and powers. It gets into the calculus of alliances, spheres of influence, and the like, to keep a satisfactory balance of forces.

One other characteristic--a strategist's problems are rooted in questions of means. He knows what he wants. The pursuit of them is linked to the need of making do. He must mediate among

competing goals. He must balance the present against the future. He knows that wishing alone never makes anything so, that splendid ideas without any clues to how to achieve them are worth a dime a dozen, and that every opportunity entails risk. He expects no final solutions. He is reconciled to Sisyphean tasks.

Still another aspect of the key term is its link to *general*. The tasks of high military commands are encompassing rather than specialized. One in supreme command must have a total grasp. His lot is to be concerned with the big picture. Let his surrogates down the line be content with a narrower view of their duties. He must be a generalist.

Most of us are not cast as strategists. Our lot is to attend to our specialties, smaller or greater. Here, for this all too brief conference, the stress has been on breadth and perspective. I trust you have got something from it. I know that having you here has benefited the Navy's thinking.

My reference to the relative novelty of strategic thinking in United States policy is not intended to attribute a cramped way of thinking to earlier generations of Americans. To the contrary, a broad and sweeping approach to world politics has long been in the American character. In earlier phases—this is my point—the United States had no trouble in meshing security requirements and national precepts. During that century and more spent in fusing into nationhood and rounding out a continental position, the strategic concerns of policy related only to the fending off of encroachments into the American hemisphere.

That was relatively easy—thanks largely to strategic factors attended to by others, notably Great Britain and the Royal Navy. Americans were in position to carp and to criticize the upholders of the shield just as in our own time beneficiaries of United States protection are wont to do.

The nation's broad precepts were—and still are—the ones articulated in the Declaration of Independence. It is a document about foreign policy. It asserts a doctrine about the world environment. The world is a rational world, where truths are self-evident, with a basically unified mankind, whose opinions deserve decent respect. It asserts for the nation a right to an equal station in the nexus of diplomacy in place of subordination in a colonial order. It asserts a similar inherent right for all peoples.

These precepts are bred into our bones. Equality among mankind is a traditional part of our creed. That equality is assumed to have a political cast. Capacity for self-government is assumed implicitly as a universal endowment evenly apportioned. Any regime's rightful powers can stem only from consent. Government from afar violates consent. Hence peoples must be indigenously governed to be governed accountably. Accountable governments will govern well.

Certain corollaries flow. People well governed will not be tempted to exert dominance over others. Hence independence in particular will sustain independence in general. The autonomy of peoples will engender community among peoples. All organized societies will have, and acknowledge, a stake in the independence of others. The security of each will become meshed with the security of all. Peace and universal independence go hand in hand.

All that has an Euclidean sort of clarity and persuasiveness, is accepted on its own terms. Let us not argue the question of empirical proof. Faith in such a set of propositions was widely and profoundly held among our forefathers. In establishing independence, they saw themselves as exemplars for a world order—the *novus ordo seclorum,* the new order of the ages, still celebrated on our one dollar bills.

Under such a concept of independence as a universal and paramount good, what counts above all in respect of any position is the autonomy of the inhabitants. Strategic considerations will take care of themselves. During that departed epoch when the nation's main and virtually single preoccupation in world affairs was the Monroe Doctrine, and another people's sea power provided a vicarious shield, it became easy to regard the original precepts of independence and their corollaries as propositions sustained by their own merits and to overlook the strategic foundations.

How natural it was for Woodrow Wilson to turn to what he believed had been validated by American experience when he was called upon—the first American President to face such a challenge —to adduce some basis for reconstituting order in a disordered world. The answer to perennial conflicts of power, in his estimation, was to obviate them by bringing forward some universally acceptable rule of conduct. He found it in the traditional, hopeful American proposition about world affairs.

These concepts would serve as the conceptual foundation of the League of Nations, and the League in action would verify the

aspiration. No nation would be admitted "whose people do not control its Government," Wilson declared. Popular sovereignty would be institutionalized in world politics. Strategic concerns would be sent to Coventry along with despotism.

The United States, as we know, turned away from the Wilsonian version of a universal collective security system linked to the triumph of national self-determination and independence. It did not, however, turn to any more finite arrangement for security which would have entailed applying a strategic grasp of reality. Instead, for the time being, the nation reverted to habits appropriate to a bygone time when its strategic concerns had been vicariously attended to. That approach was no longer practical. The League failed. The experiments in tranquilizing Central and Eastern Europe through democratization failed. General war broke out again. Again the United States was drawn in.

That second time the United States engendered strong affirmations and more staying power behind the idea of a universal organization to look after peace in the sequel to victory. The new version was premised on a continuation into times of peace of the coalition prevailing in World War II.

Again, in the hopes of the founders, the venture was supposed to transcend strategic considerations. On his return from the Moscow Conference of 1943, reporting agreement among our principal allies, including the Soviet Union, to go along with the new world organization, Secretary of State Hull promised a world free of all particular and restricted devices—alliances, balances of power, spheres of influence, and the like—"by which nations have tried to ensure their security in the unhappy past." Returning from Yalta a year and a half later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt invoked identical terms.

As the world organization would obviate strategic necessities, so, it was assumed, by the same token the United States could spare itself concern over postwar implications of military dispositions. The main thing was to get the war over with in least time and at least cost in lives and to avoid doing anything to jeopardize realization of the world organization that could iron out the details later. Let strategy confine itself to winning the war. Peace would take care of itself.

Like the earlier version, the renewal of universal collective security reflected a natural and logical idea, but one fated again

to face difficulties when the unity of the principal elements of the prevailing coalition in World War II, assumed as the foundation for the new undertaking, became riven over issues of what to do with the opportunities offered by the victory.

The issues focused initially on the future of Europe, but they reflected opposed versions of the basis of a world order to replace the Europe-centered system which, having served its time, was now rapidly eroding. The main contenders were, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union, each the exponent of ideas lying at the foundations of its existence.

As the first of the colonial positions outside Europe to achieve equal station among the metropolitan powers, the United States saw its mission to be that of showing the way for a world-wide extension of the state system into which it had entered a century and a half before.

The Soviet Union, as the territorial base of a revolutionary movement aimed at subverting the state system, saw an opportunity to realize a goal that had eluded it a quarter century before —that of transforming and subsuming the state system into an entirely new order, with itself at the apex of power.

On taking charge in Russia in 1917, that regime had projected into international relations a set of corollaries derived from the Marxist theory of history. By that theory, the true believers in Marxist dogma were assumed to be entitled to steer particular societies along their predestined courses to a final resolution of all social conflict through the establishment of stable conditions of production that would bring an end to all class conflict under a dictatorship of the proletariat. Communist Russia would function in the world of nations in an analogous role. The ruling group imagined itself to be the forerunner and guide for Communist seizures of power imminently in prospect far and wide as a result of internal collapse induced by war. It would fall to Communist Russia to set and to enforce the pattern for the world's future.

The dream that this would occur in the aftermath of World War I came to naught. Even despair and defeat did not open the way to power for Communists in other lands. Such risings as they attempted either fizzled in a moment or succeeded only briefly. The regime in Russia tried to use its army as a vehicle for spreading Communist rule in a brief invasion of Poland, but

the enterprise aborted with military defeat. The regime turned inward to the harsh tasks of riveting its grip on the one established base and of maintaining a position in a world with which it was neither overtly at war nor quite at peace.

During World War II the Soviet rulership played down its revolutionary outlook while making more or less common cause against the Axis. After the end of hostilities, and notwithstanding wide ruin and privation and a net loss of twenty million lives, the Soviet Union's position and the surrounding circumstances augured for the Soviet rulership the general Communist triumph which had gone glimmering after World War I.

The Soviet Union now stood high in the councils of nations. In victory it had established a pre-eminence unknown to its past. Its massive forces had overrun Eastern Europe and stood deep into Central Europe. The rest of Europe was under its intimidatory shadow, ground down by war's fatigue, destruction, and indignity. Soviet forces also held a northern portion of Iran, some northerly island possessions of Japan, Manchuria, and a major part of Korea. Indigenous Communists had taken over in Yugoslavia and Albania and were harassing China's regime from an extensive stronghold. In many lands, local Communist groups, more numerous than ever, were acting with obstructive presumption as if certain of soon coming to power.

The United States' interim expectation of finding the Soviet Union disposed to relinquish its version of history's laws to suit other people's preferences must have been astonishing to the Soviet rulership. That expectation probably astonished that regime much more than the United States' eventual resolve to shore up positions in Europe still beyond Communist dominance. Indeed, that response probably seemed as inherent and inevitable as would be antagonism on the part of a social class about to be divested toward the class about to become ascendant.

I do not need to recount to you the line of endeavor resorted to by the United States, but I would stress that it has involved finite devices for security of a sort thought to have been relegated to the unhappy past and that the launching of the policies concerned marked the turn when the necessities of strategy first fully entered into the United States' approach to world affairs.

I emphasize also that the line of policy has been a case of embracing the second-best, which, in an aphorism of Bismarck,

is the best that any policy can ever hope to achieve. The policy does not renounce hope of eventually fulfilling the concept of an all-embracing system of security. Spokesmen for United States policy have consistently expressed a desire for the conversion of the Soviet Union and its adherents to better ways consonant with world concord. The United Nations has remained in existence as a ready vehicle for mankind's progress to that cherished goal in event of a change of heart on the other side.

One should stress also the consistency between the policies concerned and the traditional premises of the American approach to external affairs. The point is explicit in the first of the great undertakings—the containment policy enunciated in 1947 in the decision to render military aid assistance to Greece and Turkey, then both under threat from the Soviet Union. The aim is the preservation of independence for other nations. Help is offered. No presumption of taking charge of other positions is entailed. A basic civil morale on the part of beneficiaries is postulated: peoples and regimes concerned are assumed to have an adequate sense of their own identities and the attributes of nationhood.

As a whole, and within its limits, the broad undertaking to salvage Europe has worked as well as one would be entitled to hope. European economies have revived. Morale has been restored. European societies, once enfeebled by depletion and gripped by anxiety, have resumed functioning as going concerns. Fears regarding their external security have been alleviated by an alliance contractually linking the United States' expanses and resources and those of Canada to the European partners' domains in a broad regional security system.

To claim success is not to imply final solutions to strategic problems in that range. Much of your discussion here must have dwelt upon relevant issues still clouding the future—the conditions for permanent collaboration among the European allies, the puzzle of nuclear control and diffusion within the Atlantic alliance, the unanswered questions regarding still divided Germany, the Cyprus riddle, and so on through a complex array. Despite all these vexing problems, Europe has been placed beyond Soviet pressure to a substantial degree and for the time being at least—the main factor of favorable change in the contest of purpose called the Cold War.

Concurrent with this change have come prodigious and dynamic developments in weaponry. In strategy, comprehension has been pushed hard to keep pace with technology. It takes time for the

intellect to absorb what the mind knows in these matters, and even computers cannot help us much. The putative effect, however, has been to reduce drastically the credibility of deliberate decisions on either side to invoke general war as a way of pursuing advantage. Doubtlessly you have speculated upon the implications of this during your sessions here.

Now I shift focus to certain aspects of our adversaries' responses to these developments. This part of my talk brings us to areas full of problems more baffling, and to endeavors less rewarding to us, than those in the Atlantic range.

To the Communist side, the shoring-up of Europe must have appeared as a device to deprive Marxism-Leninism of a rightful inheritance. To that side, the problem has been how to maintain revolutionary momentum, or at least a semblance of it, in the circumstance of finding avenues closed and a prize withdrawn beyond the reach of ambition for the calculable future. To the Communist version of world revolution, the development has posed a problem of keeping its impetus. The idealogy has been pressed to save itself from losing all appearance of relevance. Lest the Communist pose of having the keys to the future and being destined to command events should be bereft of all persuasiveness, new opportunities have had to be found, along with new strategies for exploiting them.

The area of new opportunities is what is known, in a currently common phrase, as the third world. It is hard to define. It does not involve a single frame of dominion like the Roman World of ancient history, for example. It does not refer to a specific geographic segment, such as the New World. It does not represent a strain of common culture, as implied when one speaks of the Western World. It reflects no explicit pattern. Indeed, I have noted at least nine different sets of criteria employed in various contexts to determine inclusion in the third world.

I use the phrase as an informal designation to engross a number of states of highly diverse characteristics but one common trait: a lack of stable and developed political character.

I do not say that in a superior and patronizing spirit. There is no litmus-paper test to sort out successful and unsuccessful societies in this regard. No state ever achieves in perfection and finality the solution to problems of internal coherence. The most formidable political societies have to nurture their unity. Probably

no society can afford to count itself immune to the debilitations which I have in mind. The relevant deficiencies are by no means uniform through the so-called third world. Some of the societies concerned seem to stand a fair chance of making good. Others are clearly in a bad way.

To sum up: The third world comprises about half of the states in the contemporary world. For them functioning as going concerns is proving enormously difficult. In a rough aggregate, these states comprise some 30 percent of the earth's population. These states are necessitous. They command perhaps a tenth of the world's productive wealth. Their latent wealth may be much larger than that, but their share of the talents relevant to modernity is small. Their conduct in world affairs is greatly affected by their consciousness of discrepancy between their juridic standing on a plane of equality in the state system and their practical disabilities.

A sense of history from which to draw relevant guidelines applicable to contemporary ambitions may be missing. Identity between peoples and regimes may be weak, so that those exercising authority, and those subject to it, are not agreed or certain about mutual relationships. The foundation of legitimacy is likely to be weak, the concept of allegiance brittle, and the structure of authority dilapidated. Moral alienation is likely to be rife. Such order as obtains is often of a fragile sort relying chiefly on coercion. Even for effective coercion, the instruments may be inadequate. The only catalyst for even a semblance of unity may be to invoke animosity. The traits assumed by Aristotle in expounding the golden mean as the touchstone of a good society may be lacking. In many instances channels of communication, avenues for ready deployment of forces, and means for guarding the periphery may be deficient. In sum, the character of the populace and physical factors afford wide opportunities for internal warfare. When hostile interests hold sway in an adjoining country, the danger is so much the greater.

It would be well worth our time, if we had the time, to assess the relevant dangers in several areas or ranges—South Asia, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean area, and continental Latin America. I shall confine my observations to one considerable range—East Asia, including the southeast portion. Events there have had a considerable bearing on the development of Communist doctrine concerning the third world. In turn, that area is the scene of the clearest present contest between Communist doctrine and the purposes of the United States. I am not

going to unfold the whole story even for that portion of the globe. I am going to call up some recollections about China, Korea, and then Southeast Asia.

Anyone trying to look ahead to the third world problem as of twenty years ago might well have selected China as a prime candidate for inclusion. China's history, the longest among nations, provided little that was relevant to the requirements of the modern world. Recent decades had brought many ordeals in the conflict between tradition and modernity. The difficulties had been enormously aggravated by the years of invasion and occupation leading up to and encompassing World War II. The country had a relatively solid regime in the sense of not being challenged from within the regime itself. Its effectiveness had been eroded over the countryside, however. It faced a formidable challenge from Communist forces with a strong base from which to harry the regime. The state had long been subject to subordinating restrictions with respect to other countries. Victory was supposed to bring it the honor of a place among the great powers—a goal long promoted by the United States, whioh regarded itself as China's special friend in the world.

The Communist threat increased in proportion as the regime's incapacity to handle the problems of the tired, distraught land was manifested. During four postwar years, United States policy tried one expedient after another in trying to fend off the final debacle. True to our national habit, this Government assumed a golden mean to exist in China—some civic-minded consensus latent in the populace. Only a few fragmentary and timid groups worthy of the description could be found. Another foredoomed hope was that of finding among the Communists some hidden essence that would subordinate revolutionary to national interests—thereby to provide a basis for collaboration between the challengers and the challenged. The Chinese Communists were of no mind to yield on their revolutionary aims to take over the whole position. The United States also tried aid in the form of economic assistance and military equipment and advice. The trouble was that help did not help much.

That is the sum of the rueful account in the United States Government's white paper on China in 1949, after the Communist accession. It is still a fascinating document to read. "Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result," is the conclusion reached.

The phrase "reasonable limits" is interesting. Perhaps a commitment and an effort by the United States on the scale of its later undertaking on the periphery of China could have salvaged the situation. I remember Jim Forrestal discussing this possibility with me one day at lunch in 1946. No one will ever know for sure. The white paper recounts the issue whether to involve the United States in China's internal war in the same degree as its involvement in the concurrent effort against armed subversion in Greece. The white paper says this would have required "an advisory group of many thousands, unpredictably large amounts of equipment, and the involvement of United States' advisers in the direction of modern large-scale." The assurance of success was too slim. The white paper adds: "There was no reason to think that the furnishing of additional military assistance would substantially alter the pattern of military developments in China unless a great number of Americans were involved, possibly in actual combat, and unless this Government were prepared to underwrite permanently the success of the Chinese Government's military operations." Such a deployment and such a commitment would have raised an irreducible question of who was to be in charge. To avoid being a tributary, the United States would have had to assume mastery. Implicitly, our traditional inhibitions against finding ourselves in an imperial posture—against taking charge—had much to do with the definition of "reasonable limits."

The white paper of 1949 signs off with some wan hopes: "We continue to believe that, however tragic may be the immediate future of China, and however ruthlessly a major portion of this great people may be exploited by a party in the interest of a foreign imperialism, ultimately the profound civilization and democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke."

That phrase—"democratic individualism"—is an interesting example of self-projection. I am told that it is untranslatable into Chinese.

By 1950, the United States had liquidated its involvements in East Asia. The containment line was explicitly drawn through a series of offshore positions. While writing off China, it retracted its occupation forces from South Korea. It gave no pledge to protect the regime set up there under United Nations' auspices and at the United States' behest. To have done so would have given juridic standing to the bisecting of Korea at the demarcation between the United States and the Soviet occupation zones.

Conceivably the United States might have left a modest-sized unit on the scene to fly the flag as a keep-out warning. That would have raised the same irreducible question as was implicit in the China situation—the choice between keeping control and losing control.

On whatever terms, the South Korean regime would have preferred alignment with the United States. In retracting its forces and offering no pledge, the United States, instead, implicitly consigned South Korea to the third world. Misestimating the opportunities, the Communists—North Korean elements with obvious but unacknowledged aid and guidance from the Soviet Union—moved across the demarcation line. The aim was to move South Korea out of the third world and into the Communist realm. Much to their astonishment, the attackers found themselves in a war, when the United States acted in instant recognition that it was involved irrespective of the pattern of its preferences and pledges. The unambiguous character of the attack enabled the United States to obtain the United Nations aegis for the countering effort.

While the Russians were sponsors, the attack from the north came a cropper. The Chinese then took a hand, with greater boldness and commitment than the Russians had shown. They reversed the trend, and achieved a standstill. That standstill became the basis of an armistice. The opposing coalition, led by the United States, elected, I believe wisely, to confine the fighting to the Korean peninsula and not to seek a redress of strategic factors in a wider region. That armistice, however, left the United States in a position it had devoutly sought to avoid—with forces on the Asian mainland. It would no longer be a case of trying to assign South Korea to the third world. The ground had to be held. The United States now had responsibilities without dominion. The United Nations' good housekeeping seal helped mitigate the difficulties.

The Korean venture turned out to be the most unsatisfying of wars. It was a vexing and costly fight, under ambiguous conditions and with ambiguous results. It occasioned the extension of the containment policy to the Asian mainland—but with more rue than affirmation. "No more Koreas!" became a watchword in military planning and in civil policy circles—echoing an understandable distaste for getting bogged down in prolonged and ambiguous hostilities and indeterminate responsibilities in marginal and unsatisfactory positions. It remained to be seen whether events would work out to grant the wish.

After the Korean armistice the Chinese were able to redeploy significant amounts of equipment to exploit opportunities in Southeast Asia. In Indochina, French forces had been trying without much success to cope with an indigenous rebellion, supported from China. The issue was not the question of French withdrawal —which was already pledged and scheduled—but the timing and conditions of withdrawal. The rebellion aimed *to force* the French out and to bar them from any role in arranging the structure to succeed their control. I stress this mainly because the situation has been retrospectively misrepresented at so-called teach-ins, which are this spring's equivalent to tree-sitting and the marathon dance.

During the Korean War the United States had undertaken a large share of the material burden of the French effort. The Chinese inputs after the Korean armistice intensified the fight, and by 1954 the French effort was playing out. The United States was stayed from direct involvement by the counsel: "No more Koreas!" A gesture to stave off the worst by invoking a possibility of nuclear retaliation was not persuasive. So the French gave up.

In an international conference to settle new arrangements in the wake of French dominion, the three lands comprising Indochina—Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—were recognized in formal independence on their promise to keep out of alliances, to permit no foreign bases on their territory, and to refrain from seeking or receiving military aid beyond prescribed modest limits. Vietnam was divided—a Communist oriented regime in the north, and a non-Communist one in the south. These two were hopefully to decide on a regime to reunite the land in elections two years later. The countries on the outside undertook a general hands-off pledge.

The United States, along with South Vietnam, did not sign the accords but agreed to follow their restrictions. It was anxious to deter further Communist advances. The aim was to provide the component lands a chance to remain in the third world. The Korean precedent was fresh in mind. The omission of a specific defense pledge would not be repeated. The result was a treaty setting up a security system for Southeast Asia, with an accompanying protocol articulating the participants' concern for the independence of the lands of former Indochina. A number of other countries—local and afar—went along with the project, but the source of its substance was to be the military potential of the United States.

Containment was now extended on to difficult ground--no doubt of that. The thought has been voiced by innumerable critics. A fair argument over courses chosen requires appraisal of the choices available. Obviously the United States could have decided to stand aloof from the region in the sequel to the 1954 accords. You can well imagine the recrimination in that event--the protests against irresponsibility in shrugging off a resourceful and populous region, the charges of improvidence in repeating the error of omission made in regard to Korea, and the invidious comparisons between national concern for relatively affluent Europeans and indifference to necessitous Asians.

At this point let us reflect on the inferences as drawn within the Communist establishment from the events I have all too simply recounted.

China's shift from the third world to communism was in its way as momentous as the salvaging of the European position from a drift toward communism. It tripled the numbers of people under Communist rule, added 40 percent to the territorial range, opened up new accesses for Communist operations over a wide arc of South and Southeast Asia, and dispelled assumptions that the Communist thrust had been brought to a standstill.

That shift came somewhat as a surprise to Moscow, which seemed not to have expected it so soon. Indeed, Moscow had tended to neglect the possibilities offered by the third world. Its own dogmatic analysis had prevented foresight concerning the rush toward decolonization--which supposedly could be brought about only by Communist pressure.

In seeking to take advantage of the windfall, the Communists could not count on many other instances of their good fortune in China in having a sizable armed force at their disposal. They would have to make do with what help they could get from other dissident forces, and from inhibitions and doubts in the adversary camp.

The blunder of overt attack across a boundary--which in the Korean instance triggered United States resistance, and enabled it to get United Nations support--must not be repeated. Under conditions attending lower levels of interposition, the American distaste for getting bogged down in far fields will come into play. The sentiment of "No more Koreas!" can be turned to account. So also can the Americans' inhibitions growing out of the

antiimperial tradition, along with trepidation concerning war's potential for slipping its tether–escalation, as the current cliché puts it.

By 1960 they had framed a doctrine. It has become the focus of voluminous theorizing within the Communist realms. Both polar capitals of communism affirm the doctrine, however much they may differ on expediential questions in applying it.

The doctrine is linked to the Communist theme of peaceful coexistence–the pattern of avoiding dangers of general warfare while pushing ideological expansion wherever possible and trying to move events along a course to enhance Communist advantage and to precipitate the historic defeat of non-Communist interests.

In Communist usage, such interests are called imperialist. The term has no necessary link to jurisdictional arrangements. Any resourceful regime or country which is non-Communist is *ipso facto* imperialist. The term colonial is applied analogously. An imperial-colonial relationship, in this lexicon, is simply one between disparately resourceful non-Communist countries, whereas a disparate relationship between a Communist country and any other is by definition nonimperial. Relations between the Western powers and the third world are therefore inherently in the imperial-colonial mold. Anything tending to break up such a relationship is against imperialism and makes for progress toward communism's presumably predestined victory. The third world's destiny is to be recruited into the Communist camp. In forwarding that end, the Communists will make use of whatever short-run allies it can find –a hitchhiker for the time being, intent on taking over the wheel when opportune.

Violence with a purpose of worsening relationships and creating divisions between less advanced and more advanced non-Communist countries is thus called liberating and historically right, and violence the other way around is historically illicit. One side may hit. The other must not hit back. Organized violence tending toward Communist advantage in the mold described is called national liberation war. Communist powers claim a right to foster such wars, and no one is supposed to have a right to hinder them. Peace is a situation free of dangerous levels of violence and conducive to Communist interests. National liberation wars are portrayed as wars for peace. As a corollary, to be peace-loving is to be for national liberation wars.

It is with this set of doctrinal propositions that the containment policy has come to grips in former Indochina as a testing ground. We all know the story from where I left off the account a moment ago: the failure--to no one's real surprise--of the arrangements entered into upon the French withdrawal; the abandonment of the dream of an impartial ballot as a way of unifying two inherently irreconcilable regimes in Vietnam; and the persistence of Communist efforts to pre-empt control in Laos and of the regime in North Vietnam to annex the South on its own terms. These are linked positions: Laos providing a side door into South Vietnam from the north, and South Vietnam presenting a natural avenue to the rest of Southeast Asia. The designs have had support from both polar capitals of communism. Both targeted lands have provided ample opportunity for the doctrine of national liberation war.

Our present focus is on South Vietnam. It has been and remains the scene of pervasive internal strife. Internal strife has provided opportunity for outside Communist intervention. I stress the dual and interactive character of the strife simply because learned professors at teach-ins have argued the matter as if there is something mutually exclusive as between internal strife and intervention, so that evidence pointing to the former precludes possibilities of the latter.

By 1961 the rate of attack against South Vietnam had reached proportions necessitating abandonment of restrictions under the defunct 1954 accord if the position were to be saved at all. Thenceforth the rate of assistance and the proportions of the United States military presence have gone up step-by-step, matched by the rate of effort from the other side. By the spring of this year the United States resorted to a line of effort it had previously renounced--selective bombing forays against the north. These have been accompanied by proffers of negotiation, with a promise of largesse to the North Vietnamese regime in return for its desistance from collaboration in the Communist program of national liberation wars as applied to South Vietnam.

The approach reflects two basic hopes. The first is that of inducing North Vietnam, by a mixture of reward and punishment, to opt for a drift toward a third-world position and away from the Communist camp and to leave its neighbor alone in that spirit. The second is that of finding the Soviet Union disposed to renounce tacitly, at least in this instance, its adherence to the doctrine of national liberation wars lest it contribute too greatly to the enhancement of its Chinese rival for ascendance within the Communist realm.

Without venturing too far into prophecy, I think it proper to warn you against an excess of confidence in either of these two possibilities. Meanwhile, unless something gives, the indications point to a prospect of indeterminate involvement for American forces in an East Asian position additional to the one south of the armistice line aslant the 38th parallel. Such an inference is implicit in the expansion, increment by increment, of the United States ground forces deployed to South Vietnam. Whatever our preferences, events may not accommodate the wish of "No more Koreas!" In this instance it is not possible to count on anything equivalent to the mitigating effects of the United Nations emblem covering the position in Korea. I should not wish to tell you that the attendant problems will be easy.

The circumstances are, to the contrary, likely to be full of vexations. They will provide a hard test for the national spirit. The adversary will wring every advantage he can out of his own system of nomenclature, whereby any exercise of power to impede Communist purposes is imperialist. This will find responses even among men of good will in our own society—as evidenced by the teach-in phenomenon.

Commentators will deplore the tribulations inherent in the contested terrain. They will voice their preferences for a strong stand at some more appealing and commodious barricade somewhere else at a later time. The fastidious will pine for a more immaculate ally—endowed with such competence and civic morale that our help would not be called for.

The answer, of course, is that the preferable positions are not now the ones under challenge. The challenges as they arise from here on will all be ambiguous, vexatious, unappealing.

This point I would add to my observations concerning the strategic view at the outset of these remarks. "The Nature of Things," as James Gould Cozzens tells us in *Guard of Honor* "abhors a drawn line and loves a hodgepodge, resists consistency, and despises a drama." This is the nature of things in the strategists' world, to be sure. The policy-maker is never entitled to walk away from a problem on the ground that it is too full of difficulties and has no right even to exist.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

The Honorable Paul H. Nitze
Secretary of the Navy

Mr. Nitze was graduated from Harvard University in 1928 with a B.A. Degree, cum laude.

In 1942 he left his position as Vice President of Dillon Road and Company to become the Financial Director of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. From 1943 to 1944 he was Director of the Foreign Economic Administration, and from 1944 to 1946, he served as Vice Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, for which service he was awarded the Medal of Merit by President Truman.

From 1946 to 1953, Mr. Nitze served with the Department of State, moving from the position of Deputy Director, Office of International Trade Policy, to Deputy to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. In 1949 he joined the Policy Planning Staff of that Department as Deputy Director and in 1950 became Director of that Staff, a position he occupied until 1953.

He then served concurrently as President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation and Associate of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the School of Advanced International Studies.

Mr. Nitze was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) by President Kennedy, taking his oath of office in 1961. In 1963, he was appointed Secretary of the Navy, the position he has served in since.

NEW DIMENSIONS IN EXTENSION

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . the texts employed in the International Law Correspondence Course were used in the first Korean peace talks? A former student relates how:

> It was only through the fine cooperation of the Department that I completed this course. This course has traveled over a considerable part of the world with me and the reference books were separated from me a considerable amount of time. My books were with me on the flagship in Inchon when the Korean peace talks commenced. They were the only books on the subject in the area at the time. The books were sent to the peace camp immediately, and I understand from officers who were there that these books were indispensable at the time. The prisoner-of-war question arose during the first meetings, and it was necessary that the UN negotiators be armed with as much information as possible at each meeting. Unfortunately some of the books were lost, as previously reported, but I sincerely feel that they have been worth their weight in gold.

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . a recent enrollee in the International Law Correspondence Course is a member of the staff of the Legal Advisers Office, Department of State? This Naval Reserve Officer had this comment concerning the International Law Course:

> . . . I think the course is excellent. From my previous experience with Navy courses, I had not expected anything so well conceived and thoughtful—and I might add, demanding. Among other benefits, I also had not realized before the great extent of the Navy's work and contribution in this field.

THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY AND THE UNITED STATES NAVY–1970

A Research Paper written by
Commander Burna D. Levi, Jr., U.S. Navy
School of Naval Warfare, 1965

INTRODUCTION

The Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security will be susceptible to first renegotiation in 1970. This is not to say that the Treaty will be terminated or even that renegotiation is mandatory. The apparent mutually compatible relationship between the United States and Japan would, on the surface, tend to discourage consideration of this future event, particularly in view of the myriad of other world problem areas with which the United States is currently faced. History and contemporary writers, however, have emphasized the accelerated rate of change in international affairs and attitudes; the increasing influence of political, economic, and social factors on the military position; and finally the changing phases of United States national strategy. These same sources disparage the American penchant for myopic obsession with contemporary problems while ignoring or taking for granted passive or latent relations. This idea gains importance with the realization that many of these problems are generated by sources other than the United States or over which this country has little control. Too often, as a result of these influences the military forces find themselves in weak or untenable positions from which extrication in the face of international events or crises would be accomplished only at the further risk of temporary degradation of security posture, national embarrassment, or loss of prestige.

The persistence of the unexpected is acknowledged. In spite of this, the question remains as to whether it is possible through a continuing review of factors having a potential effect on a future known event to meet the occurrence with a positive response rather than to react negatively after the fact. The requirement for uninterrupted naval strength in the Pacific and the effect of the Japanese-American Treaty on the United States Navy in that area seem to make consideration of this subject appropriate. From the foregoing, it is apparent that this consideration cannot be treated in a vacuum. The Treaty affects not only the sister services in the Defense Department, but encompasses international cooperation in nonmilitary matters. It is affected by other international documents and by both Japanese and American influences. In order to treat the subject in meaningful depth and yet within manageable scope, it will be the purpose of this paper to develop only those facets of documents and Japanese and American factors which seem to have sufficient bearing on the Treaty to provide an objective determination of its possible future. From this consideration an attempt will be made to formulate conclusions and recommendations pertaining only to the United States Navy.

CHAPTER I

DOCUMENTARY FACTORS

The Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the progeny of several historical documents which precede it. Some of these, such as the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, are significant in their contributions as the source for initial Japanese-American relations following World War II and as guides for the subsequent Japanese Constitution and treaties. These later documents, however, directly interrelate with and influence the subject Treaty. A chronological review of their contents and the circumstances surrounding their formulation and change seems to reveal a trend in Japanese-American treaty relations which, if continued, could very possibly manifest itself in a mandate for renegotiation of the Treaty in 1970. The first document in this chronology is the Japanese Constitution.

Japanese Constitution. The Japanese Constitution was announced on 6 March 1946. It was the result of extremely close but not always compatible consultation, which began as early as October 1945, between the Japanese government and United States Occupation authorities. At that time, General MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) urged Prince Konoye to take the leadership in liberalizing the old Japanese Constitution.[1] After a period of disagreement with the Japanese concerning the extent and nature of the modification, the SCAP directed his Staff Government Section to prepare a model constitution. This effort which served as a guide for the Shidehara Cabinet was the most effective method of instructing the Japanese on principles that he considered basic. One significant element of the draft was to be a statement that "War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and *even for preserving its own security.*"[2] This prohibition against preserving security was not included in the final draft by the staff lawyers, however.[3] The Constitution as finally accepted by the Japanese conformed very closely with the draft, and the essence of SCAP's instructions concerning Japanese war potential is embodied in Article IX.

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the

threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.[4]

This article has been interpreted, on the one hand, to specify the demilitarization of Japan to the extent that her security must be guaranteed by a foreign power; it thus forms the basis for a security treaty. On the other hand, the previously mentioned omission or deletion by staff lawyers has permitted an interpretation or defense rationale that forms the basis for the Japanese Self Defense Force. This paradox, together with the taint of Occupation control over the contents of the Japanese Constitution, has given rise to much discussion in the Diet with regard to amending the document so that it might reflect current Japanese sovereignty and conform more closely with present-day realities. The Constitution Research Council was established in 1956 by the Hatoyama Cabinet to develop conclusions concerning Constitutional amendment. This council reported on 3 July 1964, in favor of revision. Prime Minister Ikeda demurred on this step, however, since he was aware that public opinion polls indicated a majority of opinion against change.[5] Whether or not this condition has been reversed in the brief period of seven months, the new Premier Eisaku Sato is not so reticent. On 19 January 1965, the ruling Liberal-Democratic party adopted the revision of the postwar Constitution as its goal for the year.[6]

The influence of the Constitution on the current Treaty is centered in Article IX and the question concerning Japanese military forces. Also, the Constitution, formulated under the firm Occupation guidance, serves as a point of departure from which to trace the course of developing changes in Japanese-American postwar relations. The Constitution was created during the Occupation of Japan. The reaction to the very recent war is apparent in its Preamble. Russia, although showing signs of hostility, was still generally considered an ally. Chiang Kai-shek was still on the mainland of China. This situation had altered considerably by the time the next document in the chronology came into being.

Peace Treaty. On 8 September 1951, 48 nations and Japan signed the Japanese Peace Treaty in San Francisco. The Treaty

entered into force on 28 April 1952. During the interval between acceptance of the Constitution and this event, the international scene had undergone major changes. The Cold War chill had definitely set in. Chiang Kai-shek had been evicted from the mainland of China, and the Communists were in control. The Korean War was currently in progress. The Occupation of Japan was in its sixth year, in spite of the original three-year estimate by General MacArthur, and was experiencing a period of diminishing returns.[7]

The Cold War and the fall of China to the Communists were the events which finally dominated the preparation of the Treaty. Mr. John Foster Dulles, who had been given the authority and responsibility for bringing a treaty into being, had at least one firm conviction: In the postwar era the greatest threat to peace was the Communist movement, and not a resurgence of Japanese military power. Further, the lessons of the Versailles Treaty had established the view that imposition of harsh retaliatory terms on a defeated enemy out of fear that the enemy would become militarily powerful again was an unsatisfactory measure.[8] This theme pervaded the year-long negotiations between the Allied Powers. Mr. Dulles had instituted bilateral diplomacy for this purpose to circumvent Soviet obstructionist tactics which were anticipated in a traditional peace conference. There was evidence of a firm desire that the terms of the Treaty be such as to win Japan's allegiance as a strong ally of the West rather than to impose the retribution of the victors over the vanquished. This evolutionary attitude was reflected in the Preamble: "Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth, their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals . . .."[9] This could be regarded as the first step in the changing trend in Japanese-American postwar relations.

The distinction became more apparent as a product of the old attitude, Article IX of the Constitution, haunted the treaty-making process. The Article had struck the imagination of the war-weary Japanese. The people now desired neutrality, disarmament, withdrawal of Occupation forces, and guarantees of inviolability by the United Nations. America's allies, particularly Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, were understandably not as quick to make the transition and endorse scaled-down reparations and a rearmed Japan. The original concept of a Pacific security pact which would have included all of these countries plus the United States unfortunately had to be fractionalized. The individual countries were not yet ready to enter into a common arrangement

with their recent enemy.[10] Even within the United States government there was divergence of opinion. The State Department, abetted by SCAP, favored early conclusion of a peace treaty, end of the Occupation, and, in general, the continued observance of Article IX of the Constitution. The Defense Department claimed that the Treaty was premature. The Navy insisted on retaining control of the Japanese-mandated islands and the Ryukyus. Neither the Army nor the Navy was impressed by the antiwar Article. Both were willing to rebuild Japanese arms; but they also wanted to retain Japanese bases during the interim.[11]

All of the foregoing conflicting desires bore on the Treaty. The mechanics of reconciliation were conducted through a series of vehicles. The fear of a resurgent Japan on the part of the American allies was allayed through creation of the three-power Anzus Pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States and a separate bilateral American-Philippine security arrangement.[12] The Navy's requirement for the Ryukyus was temporarily answered in Chapter II, Article III of the Treaty, which gave the United States trusteeship, exercising authority but not sovereignty over the islands.[13] One of these, Okinawa, now figures prominently in United States-Japanese relations. The desire for American bases in Japan and provision of security for the physically and mentally disarmed country were questionably but effectively satisfied by a concurrent bilateral security treaty.

Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan. Signed on the same day as the Peace Treaty was another document, the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, also known as the 1951 Security Treaty. This Treaty becomes germane to a consideration of the trend in United States-Japanese relations when its contents are compared with the current 1960 Treaty which supersedes it. Although the Peace Treaty recognized the equality of Japan in principle, actual conditions prevented this from becoming a reality. Not the least of these was conflict with Article IX of the Constitution. The drafters attempted to bridge this dilemma with the following clause in the Preamble to the 1951 Security Treaty:

> The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defenses against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat . . ..[14]

How offensive armament was to be distinguished or how Japan was to assume increased responsibility was left to conjecture. Nevertheless, since this corner has been turned, the United States has persisted in encouraging Japan to comply with this conflicting pronouncement and increase her defense effort.[15]

In view of existing circumstances, it would have been difficult for the Treaty not to have reflected the actual inequality in the statuses of the two countries. As a result, the Preamble recognized the 1951 Security Treaty as provisional.[16] At least six points were cited by the Japanese as witness of the inequality and as justification for renegotiation of the Treaty. First, although Americans were provided the right to maintain bases in Japan, there was no clear stipulation obligating them to defend the country. Second, without prior consultation, United States forces could be deployed from Japan for the maintenance of peace anywhere in the Far East so that there was a danger that Japan would be drawn into a war (Art. I). Third, American forces were authorized, albeit at the request of the Japanese government, to quell large-scale domestic riots and disturbances (Art. I). Fourth, Japan was denied the right to grant bases to a third power without prior consent of the United States (Art. III). Fifth, the compatibility between the Treaty and the United Nations Charter was not sufficiently definitive. Sixth, no effective Treaty term was specified.[17]

With regard to expiration provisions, Article IV of the Security Treaty states:

> This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the government of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United States or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area.[18]

Whether the conditions for termination, as outlined in Article IV, were actually fulfilled, the point remains that it was Japan and not the United States that initiated the proceedings. On a visit to the United States in June 1957, Prime Minister Kishi proposed to President Eisenhower the revision of security arrangements between the two countries.[19] The United States may have felt that she could not reject the proposal and still maintain friendly relations with the Japanese; whatever her reasons, she

acquiesced. Secretary of State Herter's justification for accession seems pertinent to a consideration of possible reasons for future renegotiation of the new Treaty in 1970:

> By 1957, Japan had made great progress toward lessening its dependence on the United States. Its restoration to a respected position in the community of nations was attested by its election to the Security Council of the United Nations, its defense capabilities were growing, and its economic health was vastly improved.[20]

The emphasis in the above statement would appear to be on Japan's extant independence, enhanced stature, and economic well-being. This seems significant in that the singular objective of the old Treaty had been security. At this point, Japan's defense capabilities were a growing potential, not an accomplished fact. The document that was assisting in the transformation of the potential into a semblance of reality should probably be mentioned.

Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. On 8 March 1954, in Tokyo, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States was signed. In this document Japan actually assumed increased responsibility for self-defense (Art. VIII).[21] Subsequent domestic implementary laws such as the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self Defense Forces Law transformed Japanese units into the current Self Defense Force.[22] Equally important was the Agreement's theme of "mutual cooperation," which was to appear later in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. It should be remembered that at the time of Premier Kishi's visit with President Eisenhower, the United States and other powers were conducting atomic tests to which Japan was opposed. The Premier had made a statement before the Diet in February 1957 that no United States atomic forces would be permitted to enter Japan.[23] Also, Corporal Girard, United States Army, had killed a Japanese woman gathering scrap brass on a military firing range in January of the same year. The ensuing legal controversy over trial jurisdiction was well covered in the newspapers of both countries for the following five months with an inflammatory effect on public tempers.[24]

The Washington meeting between the two heads of government resulted in recognition of a need to review the Treaty of 1951, and

charted the development of a new relationship between the United States and Japan, based on equality, mutuality, common interest, and trust.[25] Thirty-six additional months passed before these broad ideas were reduced to terms of the new Treaty. Possibly as an indication of prevailing attitudes, however, the removal of United States Army combat forces was accomplished much faster, being completed in the following year.[26]

On 19 January 1960, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed. Ratification followed on 21 and 22 June by Japan and the United States respectively.[27] One might ask what changes are reflected in this new document to correct the inequalities of the old Treaty. The use of American forces in domestic disturbances and Japan's relations with third powers are not mentioned in the Treaty. In this way, two of the six Japanese complaints are resolved by omission. By commission, the Preamble and three of the ten articles—I, V, and VII—specifically subject the Treaty to provisions of the United Nations Charter. Further, Article V obligates the United States to act in accordance with her constitutional provisions in meeting an armed attack against the territories under the administration of Japan. These are currently defined as the Japanese home islands.[28] Article VI and an exchange of notes between Premier Kishi and Secretary of State Herter on 19 January 1960 govern the employment of American forces from Japanese bases.[29] This subject would seem to require further elaboration in view of its effect on a later consideration of United States Navy commitments.

The Preamble of the present Treaty recognizes that maintenance of peace and security in the Far East is a common concern. The Far East, for purposes of the Treaty, has been defined as the region north of the Philippines inclusive, as well as Japan and its surrounding area, comprising the Republic of Korea and the area under the control of the Republic of China.[30] However, use of any United States forces based in Japan to defend the foregoing region is subject to prior consultation with, and consent of, the Japanese government. The region was not defined in the old Treaty, and there was no requirement for Japanese assent in the commitment of American forces. While Article V of the new Treaty obligates forces of both countries in defense of Japan, Article IX of the Constitution has been interpreted as precluding the use of Japanese forces outside the country in defense of the Far Eastern area. There is no reciprocity, and Japanese forces are not required to aid the United States in the event of attack elsewhere in the Pacific.[31] For purposes of contributing

to the security of Japan and the Far East, Article VI grants the United States the use of facilities and areas in Japan. The United States agrees, however, to consult with Japan regarding major changes in deployment of forces into or from the country or any changes in equipment. By this provision, Japan retains the "veto" privilege on introduction of atomic weapons into Japan or the employment of American forces from these bases in defense of the Far East.[32] President Eisenhower assured Premier Kishi that the United States had no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese government on matters involving prior consultation.[33] Previously, there was no restriction on deployment of forces or type of weapons. Finally, Japan, in Article XII of the associated Status of Forces Agreement is relieved of contributing financially to the support of American forces in the islands.[34]

Considering that Japan has acknowledged a common concern for peace in the Far East and that United States forces are in the country for defense, it would appear that Japan has gained considerable equality vis-à-vis the United States in return for what seems essentially base rights. In fact, the question might be raised as to whether the balance had not shifted in the other direction. This, and the belief that the majority of the Japanese people desire close association with the United States seem incompatible with the political furor that accompanied the ratification of the Treaty. Political factors will be treated in a later chapter.

In justifying renegotiation of the 1951 Security Treaty, much weight was given to the fact that it was an interim or provisional treaty and that the new Treaty was created in response to a Japanese desire to correct unsatisfactory provisions.[35] In projecting the trend in treaty relations forward to 1970, one might wonder if all known differences have been reconciled, or if there still remain latent conflicts to serve as a catalyst for renegotiation in the future. Congressional testimony involving Senator Theodore Greene of Rhode Island, Secretary of State Christian Herter, and Mr. Ralph Parsons, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs casts some insight:

Senator Greene: Has the United States agreed to all requests that have been made?

Mr. Parsons: No. Certain aspects had better be discussed in Executive session.

Senator Greene: In other words, this is the result of negotiations for changing the existing treaty and we only gave way to a certain extent, and there are other points which we have not assented to which they have requested. Why won't there be just as much dissatisfaction afterward as before?

Secretary Herter: That I think applies to both treaties.

Senator Greene: But it just reduces the amount of dissatisfaction while, by the same token it reduces our power to negotiate, does it not?

Secretary Herter: Yes, but we believe it is in our interests to do so.

Senator Greene: . . . this treaty does not clear up all the differences between Japan and the United States and we might expect in the future some further negotiations as to further changes . . ..[36]

Finally, Article X provides that after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either party may give notice of its intention to terminate the arrangement. In commenting on the term of the Treaty, Secretary Herter was of the opinion that the extended period was preferred over an annual basis, which was desired by some Japanese, in order to preclude a sudden loss of bases resulting from the vagaries of politics.[37]

Since the existence of Japanese influences has been indicated, consideration of this potential factor in regard to Treaty renegotiation is now appropriate.

CHAPTER II

JAPANESE FACTORS

As with any sovereign power, Japan's national character—and therefore orientation on any given subject—is made up of a myriad of complex and interacting elements. For purposes of this study, however, four of these seem worthy of consideration: politics, economics, public attitudes, and the Maritime Self Defense Force.

Politics. Although Japanese politics is made up of a plethora of parties, only four of them seem destined to influence the government for the foreseeable future. These parties are the Liberal-Democrat (LDP) or Conservative party, Socialist (JSP), Communist (JCP), and a relatively new party, the *Komeito* (JKP), which is the political voice of the *Soka Gakkai* religious group. Theodore McNelly, in his book *Contemporary Government of Japan,* reveals that contemporary parties, with the exception of the *Komeito,* are resuscitations of pre-World War II affiliations. They are not exclusive products of the Occupation, as might be supposed.[1] The purge of suspect political leaders by Occupation authorities in the postwar era drastically affected the personnel composition of parties. However, in certain attributes the contemporary Liberal-Democrats seem to have changed little from prewar orientation. "The old wine has been poured into new bottles."[2]

The Liberal-Democratic Conservatives were particularly affected by the "purge." As a result, many of the old professional politicians have been replaced by a new group of pragmatic bureaucrats.[3] Significantly, though, the current power bloc retains strong ties with the past. The present Premier, Eisaku Sato, is the brother of Nobusuke Kishi, who as Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojo Cabinet signed the resolution for war in 1941; he was imprisoned subsequently as a war criminal, but later became the Prime Minister who initiated and completed negotiation for the existing Treaty.[4] Although party factionalism has been listed as a contributary cause, the political upheaval associated with ratification of the Treaty precipitated Kishi's resignation.[5] His persistence in forcing the new Treaty in the face of adversity has been explained as a willingness to sacrifice his political future in the interest of Japan's regaining a position as a world power. Alliance with the United States was seen as a pragmatic necessity in continuing Japanese freedom and prosperity. The

renegotiation enhanced Japanese stature in the arrangement.[6] It should be remembered that it is a member of Kishi's family who is now driving to revise the Constitution.

This heritage seems instrumental in forging not only the party's goals but also its power support. The former interdependence of government and the prewar *zaibatsu* is manifested to a degree in the LDP. Marriage ties between the families of business and party leaders are not uncommon. Financial support of the party by industry has been recognized.[7] The current ten-year economy doubling plan is a product of the party. As the government in power, the conservatives have been identified as the party of "big business" and have benefited from the existing economic prosperity. By the same token, this close association would prove to be a double-edged sword in the event of a business recession.[8]

Although the method of achieving the goal is different, the stimulus for the Liberal-Democratic platform is the same as in the past--returning Japan to a position of authority in world affairs.[9] While friendship with the United States is desired and acknowledged, the cost of regaining true international stature also seems to be understood--a self-defense posture commensurate with sovereignty and a voice independent of American influence. Although an apparent awareness of the economic and political facts of life temper public pronouncements, the Conservatives argue for continuation of the present security arrangements until Japan can undertake its own defense.[10] They insist, however, that if the nation is to be truly independent, it must have the power to defend itself. Repeal of Article IX in the Constitution would seem to be a step in that direction.

In opposition to the Liberal-Democrats is the Socialist party (JSP). This party is split into left-wing and right-wing factions which have their origins in disagreement over the Japanese Peace Treaty. The right wing was willing to accept the Treaty; the left-wing was not. Neither group supported the accompanying Security Treaty. The party is endorsed, and, to a certain extent, dominated by the left-oriented *Sohyo* labor union.[11] The Socialists have rejected Communist efforts to form a united front, and Communist affiliation is denied, but, as a result of actions and pronouncements, the party has been identified with the Russian faction of the Sino-Soviet split.[12] Significantly, in view of the Conservative party identification with the current period of prosperity, the Socialists gained their brief and only majority in government as

a result of national economic difficulties in 1947.[13] Although the Socialists seem poor prospects for a return to power under current economic conditions, the possibility should not be completely discounted. This eventuality would have drastic effects on the current Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Socialists are vociferous in their denouncement of the Treaty as a violation of the Constitution. They complain that the method of deliberation and ratification in the Diet was illegal and that the pact is, therefore, invalid. The Socialists feel that there should be no American forces of any kind in Japan and desire an end to the Japanese-American security system. As an alternative they would entrust the security of the country to the United Nations and an incongruous collective security treaty encompassing Japan, the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union.[14] There is a school of thought which believes that the Socialist party would become more rational, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, if subjected to the sobering influence of government rule.[15] This idea seems to discount the prospect that conditions which placed the Socialists in power would also dictate adherence to previous pronouncements and commitments.

The political orientation of the Socialists has literally emasculated the Communist party. The left-wing Socialists compete with the Communists on ideological and policy grounds without the stigma of appearing to be subject to foreign direction.[16] Although professing independence from outside domination, the Communists have been identified with the Peking segment of the Sino-Soviet disagreement.[17] Despite the fact that the standard Communist, anti-American line is directed against the Treaty, the party enjoys little popular support and has been relatively ineffective as a factor in Japanese government. Party influence has been manifested primarily in extra-parliamentary tactics. Public reaction to demonstration violence directed against ratification of the Treaty in 1960, however, has had an adverse effect on the party.[18]

The final political party for consideration was inaugurated in November 1964, as the *Komeito,* or clean government party. The organization immediately assumed status as the third-ranking political force in Japan, since it is the successor to a former political movement of the *Soka Gakkai* religious sect. The aggressive recruitment tactics and highly organized participation activities of the party have caused concern among religious elements in Japan. A preliminary evaluation of the party would probably assign a right-wing status; however, its relatively brief history precludes an objective assessment of true orientation. A

position of power by the *Komeito* party, either in majority rule or coalition, would very likely endanger prospects for continuation of the Treaty. The platform calls for peace and disarmament, abolition of nuclear weapons, retention of the "no war clause" in the Constitution, and a more independent attitude toward the United States.[19]

The following results of past elections indicate the relative strengths of the parties in question:

HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS ELECTION 1962*

PARTY	ELECTED	HOLD OVERS	CURRENT SEATS	PREVIOUS SEATS
Liberal-Democrat	69	73	142	137
Socialist	37	29	66	65
Communist	3	1	4	3
Soka Gakkai	9	6	15	9

**Japan Report*, 20 July 1962, p. 2.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 1960*

PARTY	TOTAL SEATS
Liberal-Democrat	296
Socialist	145
Communist	3

**Japan Times*, quoted in McNelly, p. 150.

In summary, the political factors would seem to bode ill for the Treaty in its present form in 1970. The Socialists, the Communists, and the *Komeito* party are opposed. Only the Liberal-Democrats are pro-American; however, the increasing desire for an independent voice in world affairs appears to mitigate against accepting security from a foreign power if other means are available. The party's goal of revising Article IX of the Constitution could be an attempt to achieve those other means.

Economics. By almost any standards, Japan's economic recovery and development in the postwar period has been phenomenal. In 1964, Japan reported a gross national product of over $70 billion which, averaged against its population of 96 million people, resulted in a $729 per capita income. Economists expect an 11 to 12 percent GNP increase in 1965, compared to a 9.4 percent average for the past ten years.[20] The nation ranks fourth internationally in total industrial production. Only the United States, the Soviet Union, and West Germany stand higher. Japanese shipbuilding exceeds that of any other country.[21] To continue this growth, the Liberal-Democratic government in 1960 initiated a plan which calls for doubling the national income by 1970. The chart which follows reflects some of the results that might be anticipated if the plan succeeds.

JAPANESE ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR 1970[a,b]

	1956-58	1970	PERCENT INCREASE	ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENT INCREASE
Population (millions)	91.1	102.2	12	0.9
GNP (billions)	27.1	72.2	167	7.8
GNP/Capita ($)	297	707	138	6.9
National Income (billions)	22.2	59.2	167	7.8
Income/Capita ($)	244	579	138	6.9

[a]All values 1958 prices.

[b]Japan, Ministry of Finance, quoted in Warren S. Hunsberger, *Japan and the United States in World Trade*, (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 371.

Many factors have been cited as contributing to the success of the Japanese economy; two currently appear to have a bearing on Treaty considerations. First, as a result of the United States' subscribing to the security of Japan, the nation is spared the

burden of a large defense budget. The Japanese have allocated less than two percent of their budget to defense. This has permitted reinvestment of 35 percent of the gross industrial product back into domestic capital formation. The following chart compares the defense effort of various countries.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 1962-1963*

COUNTRY	DEFENSE BUDGET AS % OF NATIONAL INCOME	% MALE LABOR FORCE IN ARMED FORCES
Australia	3.22	1.45
Britain	6.67	2.47
Canada	5.61	2.58
France	7.20	5.33
Italy	4.43	2.84
Japan	1.41	0.89
United States	11.25	5.68
West Germany	5.91	2.20

*Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1962-1963*, (London: 1963), p. 25.

This saving should encourage the sufferance of American forces and bases by the Japanese. The above chart also indicates that a greater defense effort is not unreasonable if the Japanese become so inclined.

The second stimulus has been American trade. Although it has become trite to repeat that Japan must trade to live, the statement is nevertheless true. The United States provides Japan its best export market, while Japan is second after Canada in receipt of American products.[22] A preponderance of writers cite continued United States-Japanese trade relations as a cohesive factor in the alliance.

This description of the Japanese economy presents an optimistic picture; however, in the interest of objectivity, a possibly negative side should also be considered. This view would encompass the increasing costs of the Japanese economy and some of the difficulties attending the expansion of Japanese economic interests in the international arena.

Japanese industry is characterized by a technically advanced and highly efficient segment operating in juxtaposition with small, inefficient, labor intensive "cottage" production. Further, the tradition of Japanese business dictates continued employment of nonproductive workers. This inefficient employment of manpower has resulted in what might be termed an artificial labor shortage.[23] A real labor shortage has been produced, however, by Japan's success in curbing its birth rate. The nation's annual growth rate of 17.2 per thousand is roughly comparable to the West European average of 18, the United States average of 21.6, the Soviet Union average of 22.4, and the Communist Chinese average of 34.[24] The end result is that wage scales in industry are being pushed up in competition for workers. These factors are domestic in nature and would probably be responsive to corrective measures; but in the interim, the attendant high cost of production is expected to have an adverse effect on Japan as it meets increasing competition in the drive for world trade.[25]

Other obstructions to Japanese economic interests reside in the area of foreign trade practices, and seem to have a significant bearing on Japanese-American relations. Premier Sato on his recent visit to the United States presented an example in his statement:

> Japan has achieved nothing in its drive to end the U.S. equalization tax. But as I understand it, the treaty is to be enforced for the remainder of the year, and so it would be my intention to ask the United States not to have such a law again or repeal it.[26]

It is not the purpose of this paper to pass judgment on United States trade practices. The statement is cited to point up what the Japanese consider to be one of their historic vulnerabilities—foreign economic restrictive measures.

Possibly in response to a feeling of excessive economic dependence on the United States and a desire to increase exports, the Japanese have made efforts to expand trade with Communist China. Sino-Japanese trade amounted to $250 million in 1964, compared to $3.5 billion between the United States and Japan.[27] The relatively brief history and small scope of Sino-Japanese trade efforts are deemed an insufficient basis upon which to formulate conclusions at this time. Nevertheless, it would appear safe to say that this orientation is of political if not economic importance for the United States. Japan attempts to placate

American concern for this move by professing to separate economics from politics, as stated again by Premier Sato: "'We would like to deal with the Communist China question on the principle of a bigger separation of politics and economics and have continued trade relations with them.'"[28]

From the foregoing, it is indicated that the factor of Japan's economics exerts an ambivalent influence on the Japanese-American Treaty. Efforts to expand the economy may drive the Japanese to greater trade relationships with Communist China. In turn, continued success of the economy may tend to enhance nationalistic feelings and encourage increased independence from the United States. Further, it would appear to provide the financial means for expansion of the defense force to accomplish this end. On the other hand, the preponderant trade orientation toward the United States, and the economy of a low defense budget seem to temper an independent attitude on the part of Japan. Finally, in view of the previous discussion of political factors, a healthy economy would indicate that the pro-American, Liberal-Democratic party would be maintained in power.

Attitudes. As with any country, a characterization of Japanese attitudes affecting the Treaty will not reflect a unanimity of the populace. Writers and students of Japan, however, have developed what appears to be a consensus worthy of consideration. First are the remarkably good general relations between the Japanese and Americans following World War II. Public opinion polls in Japan have continually selected the United States as the best-liked country. Nevertheless, the policy of military alliance with the United States probably has support from only about one third of the people. Many Japanese see America as being militarily oriented.[29] As a result, United States bases have provided a convenient focal point for any anti-American grievances.

Two rather conflicting attitudes further inhibit Japanese defense arrangements. On the whole, the Japanese do not seem to fear the Chinese Communists, but rather are conscious of Japanese superiority in technology, administrative skill, and living standards. Seemingly reduced East-West tensions in the spirit of "peaceful coexistence" with the Soviets also reduce the urgency of defense preparations.[30] On the other hand, a certain element of the population recognizes the size and proximity of both China and Russia and seems pragmatically inclined to feel that no amount of defense would prevent a determined Communist

effort. They also remember the futility of the devastation incurred during World War II, since occupation resulted nevertheless. As a result, they appear to question a military solution for defense.[31]

In spite of these considerations, the increasing desire for "full independence" seems to be creating an atmosphere that supports limited rearmament for defense purposes only.[32] How the recent explosion of an atomic device by the Chinese Communists will influence this attitude remains to be seen. The outcome of attempts to revise Article IX of the Constitution could be an indicator. The case for an adequate military policy may well rest with the ability of the government to create a climate of opinion in which its proposals will be given the benefit of the doubt.

Maritime Self Defense Force. Admiral Mahan has written: "When for any reason sea trade is again found to pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel the revival of the war fleet."[33]

Japan's requirement for sea trade can hardly be questioned. The nation's merchant marine is represented by 4,372 ships of 8,870,150 gross tons.[34] Whether or not the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) will eventually evolve to fulfill Admiral Mahan's dictum, it seems to be a growing fleet today. The Force, which was established in 1952, is now composed of the following ships, as shown in the following table.

MSDF SHIP TOTALS*

TYPE	NUMBER
Guided Missile Destroyers	1
Destroyers/Destroyer Escorts	46
Submarines	8
Patrol Craft	17
Mine Sweepers	42
Mine Layers	2
Support Ships	5
Miscellaneous	209

**Jane's Fighting Ships 1963-64*, p. 153-164.

In spite of the obstruction imposed by Article IX of the Constitution, Japan has been building, under the second five-year defense program from 1962 to 1966, 11 destroyers, 5 submarines, 1 mine layer, and an experimental hydroplane. These ships are to be constructed in Japanese shipyards. In addition to the surface fleet, the MSDF has an air component of shore-based patrol aircraft.

Although hindered by the Japanese labor shortage, aggressive recruiting has produced a steady increase in the manning level. The Force is composed of 6,000 officers and 32,800 ratings.[35]

The JMSDF is not a large naval force; however, before disparaging its size, one should consider its defensive mission and relation to potential adversaries. The JMSDF is probably the most modern navy in the world. About 90 percent of its combat ships were launched after World War II. Personnel are well trained and there is a solid base of experience. In size it is exceeded only by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Pacific.[36]

Chapter I dealt with documentary considerations that entered into renegotiation of the current Treaty. It should be recalled that it was not so much the force in being but rather the potential for expansion under the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that recommended acquiescence by the United States. The JMSDF has five more years before 1970 in which to expand on its current respectable stature. In this light, the JMSDF, it seems, could be used again as a substantial factor if Treaty renegotiation were desired by the Japanese. The question seems to involve not so much the Force *per se* but rather the national will to employ it.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES FACTORS

> Our military policy under the Secretary of Defense is now more closely tied than ever to the conduct of foreign policy under the Secretary of State . . .. Defense expenditures in the years ahead must continue to be guided by the relentless pursuit of efficiency and intelligent economy.[1]

The quotation from President Johnson's recent defense message to Congress sets the tone and direction of military policy—or, in the context of this study, naval posture—for the foreseeable future. From this, three United States factors seem to be recommended for review with regard to Treaty determinations in 1970: foreign policy, economy, and naval considerations. Since the Navy's position in respect to the Treaty centers primarily on the subject of Japanese bases, this will tend to be the focal point for discussion.

Foreign Policy Strategy. In view of the many variables involved in foreign policy, projecting a specific, detailed strategy into 1970 would seem a risky basis for considering influences on the Treaty in relation to the United States Navy. In attempting to establish reasonable parameters for evaluation, therefore, recourse shall be made to what might be termed the essence or preponderance of views held by scholars and writers on future foreign policy strategy.

Grayson Kirk has observed that United States foreign policy has passed through at least three phases in its history and may be about to enter a fourth. The first phase was characterized by avoidance of long-term international commitments in favor of reliance on the oceans and British sea power while this nation achieved strength. The second phase, commencing about the first half of the twentieth century, involved international undertakings on a balance-of-power theory. *Ad hoc* intervention on a selected basis saw the country through World Wars I and II. The third and current phase arose subsequent to World War II, attendant upon the recognition of the threat and scope of international communism.[2] One of the stated goals of this phase has been "a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system [of government] so long as

it does not threaten the freedom of others."[3] The nature and extent of the worldwide undertaking has required international commitment with the acceptance of relatively permanent diplomatic and military associations. One of the features of this strategy has been a system of collective security with other nations under a broad concept of containment of Communist aggression. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is an example. In applauding the system, it has been argued that no member of the several alliances has suffered defeat by the armed forces of Communism.[4] To this extent, the policy and the phase might be considered a success. Writers concerned with future foreign policy strategy, however, have observed certain changes in world affairs and weaknesses in "containment" that may presage Kirk's fourth phase. In describing the limitations of "containment," the difficulty of containing revolutionary ideas in terms of physical boundaries and military force has been cited.[5] National wars of liberation and insurgency are examples. The current philosophy of "peaceful coexistence" seems to have a debilitating effect on the alliance systems by reducing the urgency of defense measures for which they were created. The insistence of sovereign nations upon freedom of action with respect to their economic and political development, both domestic and international, is tending to precipitate divergent attitudes within the collective security system.[6]

As a result of the foregoing, a fourth phase of foreign policy strategy seems to be evolving. The new theory would retain the massive military deterrent, but emphasize economics and diplomacy rather than a primarily military approach. This would be the case both against Communism and between participants in the free world alliance system.[7] In consonance with this idea, and with application to the Treaty and the United States Navy, foreign policy writers tend to advise a critical review of the merits of foreign bases which seem to entail more political liability than military advantage with United States allies. These authors do not argue that, "military considerations are unimportant or should be ignored, nor do they deny that public reactions to military policy are sometimes unwise and unfortunate." Their decisions are defended as having to be, "related to constraints that exist, not those that one would choose."[8] The trend toward increasing nationalism and sensitivity to sovereign rights is seen as anathema to American foreign bases, particularly in Asia.

This would appear to pose certain problems, since the trend does not necessarily provide a commensurate reduction in the military threat. It has been acknowledged that three possible

forms of Communist aggression will exist in Asia for the prospective future: global war by the Soviets or Chinese forces, involving strategic nuolear attack; limited war on the Korean model; and subversion or national wars of liberation.[9] To solve the dilemma of Far Eastern antipathy toward American forces and bases in spite of a continuing military threat, several concepts have been offered. Ambassador George Kennan suggests that mutual suspicion and antagonism in the Sino-Soviet split have effectively guaranteed the security of both Japan and Korea. He seems of the opinion that the proximity of these countries to the Sino-Soviet border will inhibit aggression by China or Russia for fear of opposition by the other. The necessity for American military presence is thereby precluded.[10] Another concept that is not quite so willing to entrust defense to the vagaries of Communist maneuver has been outlined by the Conlon Study. This proposal, while acknowledging the need for United States bases in 1959, suggests that as the Japanese gain strength in the future, the desirability of overseas bases will become questionable. At that time, an alliance is envisioned, with Japan maintaining her own defense. United States forces would then provide support, relying on secure bases in depth from the American continent outward to the mid-Pacific. From these bases mobile personnel strike forces and such units as atomic-powered submarines, aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and missiles would operate. The strength of this alliance should then be enhanced by greater political, economic, and cultural rapport.[11] The physical location and political status of Guam would recommend that installation for the Conlon concept. Detailed feasibility studies for the transfer of naval facilities from Japan to Guam might be the appropriate subject for another paper; however, important considerations are immediately posed. Foremost, Guam, being a territory of the United States, could be relied upon as a secure base, unaffected by foreign dictates, at all times and throughout the spectrum of international tensions. Guam is also centrally located. While it is less convenient to Korea, it is equally close to the current and possibly continuing threat—Southeast Asia. The Philippine bases are even closer to the latter area; yet they appear to suffer from the same vagaries of public opinion, cost, and gold flow as those in Japan. The industrial base, technical skill, and labor costs found in Japan are not common to Guam; nevertheless, the advantages accruing to the reduction in balance of payments, plus the permanency of the installation, would seem to temper the cost disadvantages of providing naval support facilities and labor.

The significance of the foregoing discussion is that while the basic objectives of United States foreign policy will remain constant, the strategy of implementation will be increasingly responsive to foreign influence. There would appear to be a tendency, in accommodating Japan, to reorient United States strategy in the interest of overall foreign relations, including politics and economics, as well as security. Possible future foreign policy, it is believed, will acknowledge the continued military threat in the Far East, but will be influenced by the presumption that overseas bases offer a potential for adverse effects in the overall schema. For the Navy, this would seem to require a continued ability to respond promptly and effectively in support of foreign policy, while facing increasing demands to defend the need for Japanese bases in 1970.

Economics. The economic aspects of relations with Japan are reflected in the mutual cooperation theme of the Treaty. Article II states that the two countries "will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them."[12] In actual practice, however, economic and, particularly, trade relations seem to be discussed apart from their relationship to the Treaty. This writer's research has noted little specific identification between the two except in broad general ideals. From a United States point of view, however, the economics associated with security, specifically defense costs and the flow of gold, are very closely related to the Treaty. The scope of this paper recommends these two topics for discussion as possible influential factors concerning the document.

Since "defense" represents approximately one half of the national budget, its economic significance is obvious. This point becomes intensified when other domestic programs vie for a greater share of the national treasure. President Johnson has stated:

> Arms alone cannot assure the security of any society or the preservation of peace. The health and education of our people, the vitality of our economy, the equality of our justice, the vision of the fulfillment of our aspirations are all factors in America's strength and well being . . ..[13]

President Johnson also emphasized the reduction in the defense budget over the past year and prophesied that further reductions

should be expected in order to meet other vital needs, both public and private.

One of the factors which has permitted the reduction in defense costs has been attributed to the "cost-effectiveness" policy of Secretary of Defense McNamara. This policy has been described as "first assessing military needs on the basis of the best possible defense posture, then satisfying those needs at the least possible cost."[14] The recent closure of certain bases in Spain in pursuance of this policy would seem to point up overseas bases as a potential area for further cost reduction.[15] This could apply to the East when it is remembered from Chapter I that the Japanese, under the terms of the Treaty, no longer contribute to the support of the bases in their country.

With regard to the gold-flow problem, Warren Hunsberger has revealed that although the United States enjoys a favorable trade balance with Japan, military expenditures have in effect erased this advantage. Because of these costs, the United States has consistently paid Japan more dollars than the totals accrued from America's profitable trade with that country. Since 1958, these payments have declined, but, except in 1961, they more than offset the Japanese deficit on current account.[16] In an effort to curb the outflow of gold, certain maintenance and repair services performed by indigenous labor at United States bases and many stock purchases from the local Japanese economy have been curtailed. Of the approximately 200,000 Japanese employed by United States forces in 1950-1953, only 58,000 remain. Admittedly, the first and largest reduction was a natural cutback after the Korean War, followed by the Army phase out in 1958; however, the trend has continued as a product of the deficit in American balance of payments.[17] The gold-flow problem seems to pose three adverse conditions affecting the future of the Navy's overseas bases within the Japanese-American Treaty arrangement. First, the deficit balance would appear inimical to American financial interests. Second, reducing the services performed by the bases, as a method of alleviating the problem, tends to detract from their value and, if continued, would seem to make justification of their extended existence questionable. Finally, the reduction in Japanese labor employment and restriction on local purchasing would doubtless make the Japanese less inclined to suffer the bases.

Economic factors, like foreign policy strategy, dictate a continuing and possibly increasing requirement for the Navy to

evaluate its operations and its bases within the Treaty arrangement.

United States Navy Factors. In scope, the Treaty envisions maintenance of naval security not only in Japan, but also in the Far Eastern area. Although the area has been restricted, as stated in Chapter I, the Treaty is only one of a system of Pacific alliances in which the United States is involved. Specific naval forces have not been allocated to each of the alliances. In the interest of economy of forces, the mobility of the Pacific Fleet and Marine Force has been relied upon to mutually support the entire area with the same men and equipment. This involves an area roughly 6,000 miles in length extending from Japan through Australia. Within this area and in support of foreign policy, the military threat has been deemed to include a spectrum of insurgency, limited war, and all-out global conflict. The scale of weapons may escalate from conventional through nuclear. The Navy is committed to respond within this area and within these parameters rapidly and effectively.

In support of the Treaty provisions and in justification of the bases in Japan, it must be acknowledged that the Navy has operated within this arrangement since 1960. The bases at Yokosuka and Sasebo have served as supply stock points for both the ships in port and the underway replenishment operations at sea. By having stock inventories at these bases in the area, the supply line and, therefore, reaction time in direct support of operations at sea have been reduced. This shorter transit time has also permitted the underway replenishment function to be conducted with fewer Navy support ships than would be required if the stock points were located in the United States. The excellent facilities and the efficient and relatively cheap Japanese labor at Yokosuka have made possible major repair work on all types of ships in the fleet. In some cases this work would have otherwise required a return trip to Hawaii or the United States for completion. The air station at Atsugi has served as a base for air reconnaissance patrols with land-based aircraft. Aircraft carrier pilots have used the field to maintain flight proficiency while the carrier was in port and as an emergency divert base while operating at sea. The Marine air station at Iwakuni, Japan is used for basing Marine aircraft in the Far Eastern area. The communication station at Kami Seya has provided fleet broadcast relay service. All of these functions have been convenient and have furnished desired support in the seemingly endless period of Cold War tension.

On the surface, the enumerated assets would seem to justify a continued requirement for the bases. It should be remembered, however, that during the period since the Treaty came into force no hostile military action in the Treaty area has tested this alliance. The Korean War and the peak of the Taiwan tension occurred under the now superseded 1951 Security Treaty. Significantly, the current and possibly future military threat seems to lie primarily in Southeast Asia—relatively far from Japanese bases. One of the stated reasons for renegotiation of the old Treaty was to provide Japan with more control over the use of United States military forces from Japanese bases. There was a fear that a shooting engagement involving American forces in the Far East might precipitate Japan into a war.[18] In view of the foregoing, a quote from an article on Mao Tse-tung's strategy seems relevant. "Communists understand what is frequently forgotten, that it is not simply the weapons one has in one's arsenal that give one flexibility, but the willingness and ability to use them."[19] Some of the Treaty provisions possibly should be reviewed in relation to the ability of the United States to employ its own forces when and where required.

As previously considered, Article VI and an associated exchange of notes necessitate consultation with Japan prior to deployment of significant American forces from that country in support of the Far Eastern area. General concert of purpose is supposedly assumed and expected. With the current trend toward Sino-Japanese trade rapprochement, and the public attitudes in Japan, however, it is not inconceivable that action of the United States in response to any one of many potential threats might be embarrassing to the Japanese government. A resulting veto on deployment of forces from Japan could require reorientation of the military effort at an inopportune time. When this circumstance was brought out in Senate hearings, Secretary of State Herter responded, "If you get into a period of war, what is based on Japan can be moved elsewhere."[20] While this may be a practical diplomatic solution, it hardly seems a firm basis for military planning—particularly concerning fixed bases. With the present reliance upon Japanese bases, defense of an area such as Korea would be extremely difficult if not concurred in by Japanese authorities. On the other hand, if there were accord in this instance, would not Japanese facilities be made available whether or not a treaty existed?

Another requirement for prior consultation originates in the Japanese psychosis against atomic weapons. This feeling can

be understood; however, since the Navy must respond to nuclear as well as conventional threats, the accepted prohibition against introduction of these weapons into Japan imposes severe constraints.

The subject of the use of Japanese bases points up another possibly adverse element of the Treaty. The Navy seems to gain considerable advantage from the claim of not being dependent upon overseas bases. While naval forces may have this potential, continued use of the convenience of foreign base support would seem to have an atrophying effect on the means that make the potential a reality. The practice of supplying carrier task forces at sea from mobile support ships does much to keep the technique viable. It satisfies only one element of the system, however. The convenience and economy of resupplying the support ships in Japan would seem to invite neglect of adequate numbers of ships and alternate stock points that would be required if the bases were denied under the "prior consultation" clause.

The Conlon Study invites attention to still another facet of Treaty provisions. Under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954, Japan was to develop her defense capabilities in expectation of assuming increased responsibility for self-defense.[21] In view of the scope of United States naval commitments in the Pacific, any relief in this area would appear to be an asset. The consideration of Japanese economic factors, in Chapter II, seemed to indicate that continued provision of Japan's defense by the United States had reduced the urgency of a build-up in the Japanese defense budget. It might be argued, then, that the continued presence of American forces serves to retard actual Japanese acceptance of responsibility for self-defense.[22]

The Navy can, and apparently has continued to, support United States foreign policy in the Pacific under the provisions of the Treaty. Peaceful coexistence with the Soviets and relatively subdued overt physical, if not vocal, threats by the Chinese Communists have characterized much of the period. This latter fact may be debated as a cause or result of Treaty success. In spite of the apparent compatibility of the Treaty and current Navy operations, the foregoing discussion has endeavored to point up areas for consideration if the Treaty is opened for renegotiation in 1970.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions. Looking to the future of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1970, it would seem that the following conclusions might be drawn concerning the United States Navy.

Article IX of the Japanese Constitution has inhibited the development of a sizable military force in Japan, and to this extent has served as a basis for a treaty in which the United States provides the defense for the nation. This fact has precluded the necessity of a large defense budget, thereby contributing to the phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy. This factor would seem to recommend a continuation of the Treaty on the part of the Japanese.

The ramifications of the explosion of an atomic device by the Chinese Communists are yet to be fully manifested; however, the event would seem to recommend a continued requirement for a deterrent posture on the part of Japan. It remains to be seen, though, whether or not the Japanese will retain this defense under the present arrangement. Several other defense measures afford possible choices: expansion of the Self Defense Force to a size that will obviate the necessity for assistance from a foreign source--a Switzerland of Asia; sole reliance upon the United Nations; or continuation within an alliance but with renegotiation for the exclusion of foreign units from Japan. The following Japanese factors are likely to influence the foregoing decision.

The trend in treaty relationships between the United States and Japan since the Occupation has been one of increasing recognition of Japanese sovereignty. In the case of the subject Treaty, the request for negotiation was initiated by the Japanese government, ostensibly with a view to obtaining a more favorable position in its relationship with the United States. Although agreement on many points was achieved, there still remain certain unresolved differences which may serve as a basis for renegotiation in the future.

The growth of the Japanese economy has not only enhanced the desire for international sovereign prestige; it has also intensified the desire for expanded trade. Although the United

States remains the greatest single participant in trade relations, a trend toward commercial rapprochement with the Chinese Communists has been noted. This latter development, if continued, could present a divisive effect in the concert of purpose required in a security treaty.

The history of the governing political party, which might be termed the only pro-American party in Japan, reveals a strong aspiration for greater international stature independent of United States influence. In consonance with that aspiration, the party initiated renegotiation of the predecessor of the current Treaty. In January of this year the party announced a drive to repeal Article IX of the Constitution. Success in this effort should serve to clear the way for development of an independent Japanese military deterrent–a seeming prerequisite to true Japanese sovereignty.

Finally, Japanese public opinion, while favoring Americans in general, seems antipathetic toward the military aspects of the Japanese-American relationship.

The increasing preoccupation with sovereign independence on the part of the Japanese does not seem unnatural, and the trend will most likely continue rather than recede. From this and the other factors mentioned, it would seem that a request by Japan for renegotiation of the Treaty in 1970 is a very distinct probability. Since American bases seem to pose the most tangible infringement on Japanese sovereignty, this would appear the probable subject for negotiation.

Japanese factors are not the only influence on United States bases under the terms of the Treaty. American writers on foreign policy seem especially impressed with the negative aspects of their presence in overall foreign relations. Despite the continued military threat in the Pacific, strategy recommendations advise a critical look at the necessity for the extended existence of overseas bases when they conflict with political considerations.

Projected trends in the United States defense budget seem to indicate rigorous pursuit of economy and efficiency. While this does not arbitrarily dictate termination of Japanese bases, the total cost of their operation plus the adverse effect on the balance of payments would seem to bring them under continual and critical review. The Navy, then, would be well advised to review the actual utility of the bases beyond the terms of mere convenience.

The "prior consultation" provisions of the Treaty impose constraints upon the employment of naval forces from Japanese bases. The rationale which dictated this departure also makes questionable the reliability of the bases for defense of the Far Eastern area unless the Japanese are in accord with the venture. This becomes significant in view of the possible Japanese commercial association with the Chinese Communists.

Although utilization of the Japanese bases under the terms of the Treaty is convenient during periods of reduced tension, the foregoing factors would seem to "make questionable their reliability and full freedom of action for United States forces during certain periods of conflict in the Pacific."

Recommendations. The preceding conclusions lead to recommendations of the following action with regard to the Navy and the Treaty, looking to 1970.

In the interest of Treaty commitments, operations should be continued in accordance with current practices for the present time. However, it should be realized that a change might be dictated by the Japanese, through renegotiation in 1970, or even sooner through a "prior consultation" prohibition on the employment of bases in Japan, or from United States nonmilitary considerations. In view of this, a survey of other means of providing for the naval defense of the Pacific should be explored. The defense in depth concept with a base in the mid-Pacific proposed by the Conlon Study—maybe Guam—suggests one possibility. The foregoing does not envision termination of an alliance. Trade, diplomatic and cultural rapport should remain or be increased where possible. However, based on feasibility studies, preparation for a reorientation of naval support to rely primarily on secure American bases and for a change in military psychology to incorporate a corresponding defense posture should be undertaken.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

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3. Theodore McNelly, *Contemporary Government of Japan,* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 40.

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5. "Report on the Constitution," *Japan Quarterly,* October-December 1962, p. 403-406.

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10. Dunn, p. 128.

11. *Ibid.,* p. 85-87.

12. U.S. Treaties, etc., III, Pt. III, 1952, p. 3422, 3947.

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30. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 17.

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32. *Ibid.,* p. 19-20.

33. *Ibid.,* p. 5.

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7. Knauth, p. 14.

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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Georgia Institute of Technology
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NavWarCol	Staff	1965-
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Fighter Squadron 92	CO	1963-1964
Fighter Squadron 54	XO	1962-1963
CarDiv 5 Staff	Aide and Flag Secretary	1959-1961
Naval Photographic Center	Personnel Officer	1958-1959
AFSC	Student	1957-1958
Naval Line School	Student	1956-1957
Photographic Squadron 62	Admin; Comm; A.I.	1953-1956
Naval Photo School	Student	1953
Basic Training Command, Pensacola	Instructor	1950-1952
Fighter Squadron 24	Operations	1949-1950
Attack Squadron VA1B	Personnel; Legal	1948-1949
Georgia Institute Tech	Student	1946-1948
Bombing Squadron 5	Air Intelligence	1945-1946
Bombing Squadron 7	Air Intelligence	1945
Cecil Field Operational Training	Student	1945
Naval Aviation Cadet Various stations, Graduated Corpus Christi	Student	1943-1945

SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT: REPORT ON SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

by

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A summary of the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, May 14, 1965, 412 p.

INTRODUCTION

A recent U.S. Government publication provides an exceptionally valuable assessment of the Sino-Soviet dispute and its implications. Since this topic is of such widespread interest, and since the complete record of the hearings is long and diffuse, this summary attempts to bring together systematically the major points recorded in its 412 pages. The publication presents the testimony heard from expert witnesses before a House Subcommittee from March 10 to March 31, 1965. In addition to the testimony, it includes a list of Communist Parties in all countries, indicating figures for membership and orientation toward the USSR or China (pp. 17R-19R); Russian Party and government leaders (pp. 20R-21R); Chinese leaders (pp. 22R-26R); and a chronology, April 1958 through March 29, 1965 (pp. 367-412). Witnesses heard included leading scholars and government officials: Robert J. Alexander; Zbigniew Brzezinski; Admiral Arleigh Burke; Alexander Dallin; Bernard Fall; William Griffith; Abraham Halpern; Roger Hilsman; Harold Hinton; George Kennan; Richard Lowenthal; Franz

Michael; Lucien Pye; Robert Scalapino; George Taylor; Thomas Wolfe; Donald Zagoria; and, from the State Department, Richard Davis; Marshall Green; James Leonard; Allen Whiting; and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

According to these observers, Sino-Soviet conflict involves these major factors:

1) A power struggle for leadership of the Communist bloc and movement. The Chinese aim to dominate the whole movement, but they particularly intend to gain the leading position in Asia.

2) An ideological struggle concerning evolutionary change vs. revolutionary change as the correct tactics to reach the common goal of Communist world victory. Related to this is the differing assessment of the importance of underdeveloped areas, with China allotting them first priority, and the Soviet Union, second, after its own economic development to compete peacefully with the West. This also involves Chinese suspicion of Soviet relations with the United States. Some of these observers see Soviet-United States detente as the key factor in the whole conflict.

3) China aims to become a Great Power, roughly comparable to the United States and the USSR.

4) The Soviet Union "selfishly" builds its own power and withholds substantial economic assistance.

5) The Soviet Union refused to support China regarding India.

6) China and the Soviet Union conflict on their borders. Generally these observers assess the border question as of no more than secondary importance in the dispute.

7) Internally, China fears revisionism, and a strong sense of "cultural distance" divides Chinese and Russians. China fears that the "petty bourgeois" elements, in its opinion already dominant in the Soviet Union, will grow in China, that the lack of revolutionary experience of the younger generation and the pragmatism of technicians will erode orthodoxy in China as they already have in Russia. The "European" Russians consider the Chinese alien.

Implications of the Dispute. In regard to the significance of the Sino-Soviet conflict for the United States, these observers suggest several favorable and unfavorable factors: The World Communist movement now lacks a coordinated strategy, and

comprises a divided instead of a unified opponent. The movement's unity is irrevocably shattered, and the different power-centers rest on separate cultural bases, intensifying the dispute. Ideology must be so stretched as to lose any practical meaning, to try to cover such divergent cases. Communists in all countries now can and do make choices, stressing their various national interests and particular views. Many more alternatives and far greater room for maneuver result. Communist victory in a particular place, Vietnam, e.g., does not now automatically mean extension of Soviet power. Loss of international unity tends to erase distinctions between Communists and left-wing socialists in many countries. The dispute has provided a "magnificent educational opportunity for the whole world"; we have learned many important "inside" facts.

But, competitive subversion also results: in Africa it already operates; and both Chinese and Russian arms have been competitively sent to Indonesia and Cambodia. Peking's accusations force the Russians, at least partially, to abandon peaceful coexistence and require them to support socialist countries against the West. The Soviets cannot permit China to be sole representative of revolution and radicalism.

Flat disagreement, rarely evidenced in this volume, occurs in assessment of the relationship of the Sino-Soviet dispute to Khrushchev's fall. Franz Michael, Harold Hinton, and, less categorically, Abraham Halpern, consider the dispute to have been the cause of Khrushchev's removal. Richard Lowenthal, Robert Scalapino, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, specifically deny it.

Hinton suggests an interesting hypothesis (p. 16): "Since about 1960 . . . the Soviet Union has evidently wanted the United States to stay on in Okinawa, because an American withdrawal from that important base would seriously impair the ability of the United States to continue its military containment of Communist China, with results that might involve the Soviet Union in undesired risks and complications."

Halpern and Lucien Pye argue that the Chinese have made clear gains over the Russians since the dispute became an open one. Discussion of Indonesia in this volume suggests that the island country aims at Chinese and Indonesian division of spheres of influence in Asia. Assessment of India indicates that her reputation in Southeast Asia is low, and Lucien Pye suggests, "there is a very high probability that India will find it impossible

not to follow the path of adding to nuclear proliferation." China, unlike India, is respected and feared. However, argues Lowenthal, "the prospects of communism in the world will depend . . . more and more on local conditions and the quality of Communist leadership within each country."

Eastern European countries have exploited the dispute to acquire greater autonomy; the United States ought to encourage this trend, for they look to the West and not to China. Brzezinski, however, believes that differentiated bilateral relations with individual Communist states are much less desirable than a uniform American approach to Eastern Europe; he fears "social fascism" (industrialization, nationalism, domestic dictatorship, anti-Semitism) will develop in some of them, Poland in particular, if we handle these countries selectively. Kennan stresses the importance of Yugoslavia as a test-case of national communism and opposition to Chinese views.

Cuba is judged to be the Latin American "testing ground between the Soviets and the Red Chinese for leadership and influence." Chinese pressure forces the Russians to support a revolutionary line in Latin America. Alexander supplies an excellent country-by-country survey of Latin American Communism (pp. 256-260), and Griffith does the same for Communism in Africa (pp. 265-287).

The observers agree that Chinese expansion into Soviet Asia is unlikely, but also appear to consider Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia as not profitable. China's population problem cannot be solved by migration (10 million annual emigration is not possible), and the relatively small amount of rice gained would not compensate for the political and other risks involved in forcible takeover of the area. Southeast Asia's underdevelopment further argues against significant economic gains for China. And even if China did "take over" Southeast Asia, "the tendency," argues Kennan (p. 97), "is going to be for national traditions, national deviations of psychology, national interests, national pride, to assert themselves, and they will begin to act as independent governments at some point." China follows selective and variant policies of "protection" (Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma) and "punishment" (Thailand, South Vietnam, Malaysia), and increasingly, "advantages in one area are likely to produce countervailing influences elsewhere." (Pye).

The U.S. and the Dispute. Zagoria suggests (p. 112):

> . . . the relationship among the three powers (China, USSR, USA) strongly resembles a lovers' triangle in which Peiping plays the part of the aggrieved spouse betrayed by Moscow's 'liaison' with Washington. What makes this betrayal all the more unbearable to Peiping is not only the fact that the third party is an infidel, but, more important, that it is Peiping's principal national enemy. It is as though Josephine had been seduced away from Napoleon by Wellington."

Most of these observers judge that Russia strongly desires, and even needs, good relations with the West, and that China's major aim is to destroy such relations. Vietnam and Southeast Asia appear to be effective Chinese weapons to attain their aim of splitting the U.S. and the USSR. Necessity to maintain influence in Asia and Africa, and continue world revolutionary leadership, force the Soviet Union to play, at least partially, the Chinese game. Russia probably *wants* America as a counterweight to China, and also probably hopes to pursue its own course in non-Western areas, to compete with both the U.S. and China without allying with either one. The result is vacillation and indecision, with a possible outcome, disastrous for us, of political and military extremism, and reversal or slowing down of Soviet "peaceful" evolution.

Zagoria believes that Khrushchev was moving toward, "an accommodation with the United States even at the expense of a final showdown with the Chinese" (p. 155), and Kennan suggests that, "A Soviet foreign policy based exclusively on relations with the West would practically undermine the rationale for the maintenance of Soviet power in Russia itself" (pp. 76-77). The Soviet Union strongly resists making a choice; powerful reasons cause it to recoil from China, but perhaps even more powerful reasons operate to prohibit its choosing the United States. Wolfe sees (p. 65) a tendency for Soviet citizens generally to interrelate peaceful coexistence with the West and improvement of internal living conditions, and hence a "public opinion" which favors the United States over China.

The U.S. in Southeast Asia. The interest of the United States in Southeast Asia, according to most of these witnesses, is to "contain" China so that countries that can develop viable and effective modernizing governments under the protecting wing of American power. Ideally, Southeast Asia would be "neutral" ground, where neither China nor the United States maintained

bases against the other. But the United States must not unilaterally pull out, or in any way fail to exert sufficient pressure to keep China from expanding. Two observers indicated a different assessment: Lowenthal expressed concern that a strong United States commitment in Southeast Asia would weaken our role in Europe, and he rates Southeast Asia as relatively unimportant to us. Kennan believes that the United States is already seriously overextended, and he apparently would have us maintain predominant (naval) power in the Pacific Ocean while trusting to a kind of "Titoism" to vitiate the threat of expanding communism even if China did expand through Southeast Asia.

Most agreed, however, that China must accept continued American power and presence, but some noted that China's "major goal" is to remove America from Asia. It was also noted that China considers Southeast Asia as its "natural" sphere of influence, and that the United States has no business there. Griffith suggested the parallel with Japan before World War II and that China poses a greater threat, but the United States reaction must be the same against China as it was against Japan.

The argument would seem to be that Southeast Asian governments need time to develop meaningful independence, that China threatens to take them over before they have a chance, and that the American interest is to counter China in order to give them time. The consensus appears to be that they should be protected against China by us whether they want us or not, while Kennan objects that without their conviction of a need for our protection, our efforts are wasted.

American presence in Vietnam is overwhelmingly supported by these observers. This presence serves, among other things, to support the Soviet position favoring peaceful coexistence in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Communist success in Vietnam would be followed by attempts in Thailand, Laos, and other places, and the United States involvement would become greater rather than less. The already strong Asian belief in Chinese power would be fortified, making our task more difficult. Even Bernard Fall judges that, "to maintain a non-Communist presence in South Vietnam is important to the Western World." But Fall points out the terrible problems in Vietnam, far more difficult than the situation was in Malaya (pp. 192-193). Zagoria believes that American bombings have deepened the Sino-Soviet split, and have not brought Russia and China closer together; Brzezinski agrees.

U.S. Recognition of the M.P.R. United States diplomatic recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic was generally recommended because other Asians would approve, it would constitute a pro-Soviet move in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and would prove a "valuable listening post," but Nationalist China would oppose it. Hilsman, Hinton, Michael, Wolfe, and Dallin, all indicate approval of the idea, although often with reservations as to the gesture's real importance. Secretary of State Rusk (p. 366) gave some classified testimony on the question.

Nobody called for United States recognition of Communist China, but the Congressional Committee's recommendations included: "The United States should give, at an appropriate time, consideration to the initiation of limited but direct contact with Red China through cultural exchange activities with emphasis on scholars and journalists."

Some specific recommendations were made. Brzezinski proposes a "Johnson Plan," for reunifying Europe, including, "a general all-European economic development plan." Hilsman says we must clearly indicate that we are prepared for ground fighting in Southeast Asia, and that United States troops should go now to Thailand, "to deliver the message that we intend to stay in Southeast Asia." Pye argues (p. 151) for, "a differential range of (United States) policies so that those countries that are prepared to carry on economic development along the lines that we are best able to facilitate them in should get a disproportionate amount of our aid and we should be willing to give them substantial help. This would include countries like Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand . . .." Fall, Taylor, and others argue for United States support of social reform efforts.

The Future. Brzezinski, surprisingly, appears to expect convergence (p. 305): "I would not be surprised if . . . Communists in the more developed part of the world become increasingly absorbed by the pluralistic, more stable, and more democratic Western societies . . .." Other expectations of this group are: The Sino-Soviet dispute may never result in a complete break, but the forces dividing them are powerful ones and militate against reconciliation; a "hard line" is to be expected in China for many years yet; the United States might, by aggressive policies, "force" Sino-Soviet reconciliation; there will not be war between China and Russia; the Soviet Union will continue to be a greater threat than China; the Soviet Union will not necessarily support militarily Chinese ventures; Russia does not want hostilities between the United

States and China; China needs large gifts, not loans, if it is to develop successfully; "national Communism" will develop in Asia, too; many Asians expect China to win all of Southeast Asia; there will be no unified Communist movement again; North Vietnam will resist Chinese attempts to dominate it; ideology will exert increasingly *less* influence in the Soviet Union; a strong China would constitute a physical threat to the Soviet Union; Soviet economic needs plus deterioration of ideology will influence the USSR to seek better relations with the West; China's economic needs and a new generation of leaders without revolutionary experience will erode Maoism.

In conclusion, the record of these hearings provides extremely stimulating analysis by highly competent people of one of the most important developments of our time.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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Professor Rupen is currently on leave from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he is Professor of Political Science.

He received his A.B. from Williams College in 1948, M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy in 1949, and Ph.D. from the University of Washington (Seattle) in 1954.

He spent the year 1951-52 in Munich, Germany, as a Foreign Research Fellow of the Social Science Research Council; taught at Bryn Mawr College 1953-54; was a Research Fellow at Harvard's Russian Research Center 1954-55; Research Assistant Professor and Associate Director of the Mongolian Project at the University of Washington, 1955-56; returned to teaching at Bryn Mawr College, 1956-58; and went to the University of North Carolina in 1958.

He traveled in the USSR in 1956, 1958, and 1959, and to Outer Mongolia in 1958 and 1959. He has been to Soviet Central Asia and through much of Siberia, in the Trans-Siberia Railroad.

He is author of *Mongols of the 20th Century*, 1964 and of numerous articles in *Foreign Affairs, Journal of Asian Studies, Pacific Affairs*, etc. His principal fields of professional interest are Sino-Soviet relations, contemporary Mongolia, and Russian Area Studies.

PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, California 92136

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC) Box 20)
San Francisco, California 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC) (Box 174)
San Francisco, California 96630

BOOKS

Roy, Jules. *The Battle of Dienbienphu.* New York: Harper & Row, 1965. 344 p.

There have been several previous accounts of the tragedy which befell members of the French Expeditionary Force at Dienbienphu. Mr. Roy has now added another to the list. While many of the facts of this battle may be redundant to the serious student of the French military campaign in Indochina, this version, based on personal interviews with both French and Vietminh personnel involved in this operation, research of military archives, and the author's intimate knowledge of the area, is written with authority. Credit for individual leadership, bravery, and brilliant tactical judgment is tempered by recognition of blundering strategic concepts, professional jealousies, and criminal disregard for the capabilities of the Vietminh. The author admits that he was tempted to describe this military episode as an honorable defeat. However, out of respect for the truth and for those who perished at Dienbienphu, and because many of the principal characters of this debacle are still alive, Mr. Roy felt obligated to record the facts as research revealed them. This is done in a day-to-day narrative which begins with General Navarre's assumption of military command of the Indochina Theater on through to the final defeat of General Castries in the "chamber pot" at the northeast gateway to Laos. Admittedly not in sympathy with French political objectives in Indochina, Mr. Roy, nevertheless, has attempted to record objectively the political and military factors which precipitated this ill-conceived venture--luring the Vietminh to battle in a location for which French logistic support could be only marginally provided by air resupply that was at the mercy of meteorological uncertainties. General Navarre's judgment, and to a lesser extent that of his deputy in the Tonkin area, General Cogny, was degraded by underestimating the enemy's capabilities. Neither credited General Giap with the capacity and resources to achieve mobility or maintain logistic support over long and difficult lines of communication in the face of even limited French air control. Although suffering from the lack of a detailed map, this interesting and straightforward account of the Dienbienphu Battle affords an insight into the present logistic capabilities of Communist forces in Southeast Asia.

H.N. KEY, JR.
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Aron, Raymond. *The Great Debate.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965. 265 p.

The Great Debate is a French contribution to the twenty-year old discussion of the apparent inability to use the vast strength of a nuclear armory to achieve political objectives. Mr. Raymond Aron is a renowned French interpreter of United States strategic thought, who also has an American audience in proclaiming European political views. He commences his book with a summary of the evolution of United States strategic thought, continues with a discussion of specific problems facing the Atlantic alliance, intermingling the French idea of independent deterrent, and concludes with his own look into the future. His discussion of the application of nuclear technology and military strategy to political questions is not new nor unique. He does add a continental flavor to the interrelationship between force and diplomacy with which the American reader may be unaccustomed. Furthermore, a knowledge of French internal affairs will greatly assist the reader in a clearer understanding of Mr. Aron's viewpoints. Due to the currency of the subject and the already voluminous works attempting to measure national power in the nuclear age, the first chapters of the book are elementary. Nevertheless, this book deals clearly and understandingly with the inherently complicated and esoteric theories of military interaction of various nuclear forces and their association with political reality. Perusal of this short volume leaves the reader with a real appreciation that any adopted nuclear strategy must not be so complicated that it cannot be put to practical use by decision-makers who lack the time for complete and detailed analysis and who must employ the existing political process, regardless of the theoretical merit of the strategy itself.

R.E.L. STOKES
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Barker, A.J. *Suez: the Seven Day War.* New York: Praeger, 1965. 223 p.

Suez: the Seven Day War by A.J. Barker is a book written by a soldier for soldiers. Touched with a wry humor and brightened by sprightly anecdotes, it is a terse and exceedingly readable account of the Anglo-French fiasco at Suez. Although the author stresses that the basic reasons for failure were political, he does not go deeply into the political background, and his account is almost entirely one of military planning and operation. As such, the book certainly should have high priority among War College readers.

The epilogue of this account of the seven-day war at Suez is particularly valuable in pointing out mistakes made and lessons to be derived from the Anglo-French experience. The author sums up the fiasco at Suez very briefly: "As a classic example of a 'limited' warfare operation it is unique; as an example of how such an operation should not be planned and mounted, with political interference at every step, it is equally classic." Barker stresses that the Anglo-French forces, lacking a sufficiently large and suitably equipped mobile reserve capable of striking as soon as Nasser had announced nationalization of the Suez Canal, were compelled to spend many weeks trying to gather makeshift resources, during which time world opinion was mobilized against the British and French, so that when and if they did undertake the operation, the political climate was very much in opposition to the operation. As the author reviews the situation, "there can surely have been only one real political objective: securing the Canal. This was certainly General Keightley's declared military aim and as it was not achieved, 'Musketeer' must be regarded as having failed militarily."

The Hon. R. McCLINTOCK
State Department Advisor

Ries, John C. *The Management of Defense*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 228 p.

With a certain amount of tongue in cheek, the author incites his military readers with an initial indictment: "The Army, Navy, and Air Force are outmoded. They are the vestigial remains of the last war. They represent an era that is past—a time when armies engaged armies, navies engaged navies, and aircraft engaged aircraft . . .." Therewith, Professor Ries of the United States Air Force Academy gives as the purpose of his book, to ascertain what defense reformers have sought to do and to determine their successes. The first several chapters outline the history and background leading to the formulation of the National Security Act of 1947. Much detail is given to the various schemes for this great experiment in decentralized unification, including the Collins plan, the Navy plan, and the latter's model—the British defense organization. Dr. Ries's main theme concerns the cause and effect of military reorganizations—not so much how the laws are written or rewritten, or whether authority and control is centralized or decentralized—but the way the defense secretary uses (or abdicates) authority and how he views his role in politics and defense. Subsequent chapters describe the

reorganizations of 1949, 1953, and 1958, showing how each was a further step toward centralization up to the present: "When the current defense agencies are viewed collectively—the eight combat commands, the assistant secretaries who give orders, and the defense agencies—they bear a striking resemblance to the War Department before the Root organization of 1903 . . .. Fantastic though it may seem, defense reformers have succeeded in turning the calendar back sixty years and are ready to face the demands of 'modern warfare' with a bureau system similar to one that failed to meet the test of the Spanish-American War!" *The Management of Defense* summarizes reorganizations of defense; it is of value to students in this field. The small book is well footnoted, and has an outstanding bibliography of books and articles in the related area.

B.B. GARLINGHOUSE
Commander, U.S. Navy

Cochran, Bert. *The War System.* New York: Macmillan, 1965. 274 p.

This polemical book should be read by officers interested in reactions to what is herein termed "the war system." The author reflects a kind of pacifist, antimilitary, nuclear "disarmer" point of view, which is current with large numbers of intellectuals. He argues his case dramatically and flamboyantly. To Bert Cochran, we are caught in a dangerous game played by our military political leaders who themselves are not to blame. The stakes of this game are total nuclear destruction, which the author believes is inevitable as long as the nature of the present military-political complex continues. No longer is the military-civilian dichotomy the existing situation—as it was before World War II. Now the civilian industrialists are interchanged with military leaders and to this mix has been added what Cochran calls "the university and foundation warriors." He argues that this system, enmeshed in nuclear war and strategy, is propelling us willy-nilly into an arms race which, if nations pursue their present course, will end in nuclear annihilation. This book is good on exhortation, but weak on sound historical analysis. The author misreads history and fails to see that our country has not been the causative force in the war system. Our actions have been reactions to the power development of the Communist bloc. A careful reading of our defense budgets until the middle fifties would have demonstrated the weakness in his argument. Regardless of who is wrong, the fact remains that we should all try to substitute peace for war, and reason for force.

And then, and only then, will we be able to alter the collision course of nuclear holocaust which Cochran wrongly argues is now unalterable.

W.B. BALLIS
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Millis, Walter. *An End to Arms*. New York: Atheneum, 1965. 301 p.

This is both a powerful and unusual book. Its purpose is noble and its logic quite plausible; it is almost too good, and therein lies the rub. International politics, as described by the author, is a militarized system. Here he is seeking to modify this to a demilitarized system of international politics. He quickly, logically, and rightfully rejects the concepts of general and complete disarmament as a starting requisite. Rather, he determines that the powerful military forces themselves, by their own inutility in settling power conflicts, provide the rationale for a demilitarized system. Disarmament will be accepted as new ways and means of political action are implemented. Drawing heavily from the history of the past seven decades, Mr. Millis deduces a hypothesis which would indicate that the major powers of the world are working toward the use of other than war means to resolve and limit conflicts. He contends that the Clausewitzian dictum, "War is a continuation of policy by other means," should have its emphasis on "other" as opposed to "war" means. As evidence of this situation, the scenario of the nonviolent political conflicts in the Atlantic Alliance and among the Communist nation-states is offered. Having stated his hypothesis, the author, by his own explicit admission, indulges in "science-fiction." He describes in a most rapid and general manner the world of the 1980's. Great conclaves are deliberating about the affairs of the nations south of the equator; the establishment of a world consensus, in limited areas of interest, has been achieved because the alternative is mutual and mass destruction and the military machine is becoming irrelevant.

One cannot help but consider that even though the author's hypothesis is confirmed by the "scientific rules of evidence," there is really no "proof." The subject area is a behavorial science. It would seem that the entire metaphysical substance of man would have to change before the author's prophecy could

be accepted. But to be skeptical in this case, one would have also to be skeptical of skepticism.

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